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NOTES
LIABILITY OF RECONSIGNORS FOR FREIGHT CHARGES*
THE Interstate Commerce Act requires carriers to collect a reasonable
charge for their services without discrimination among parties to a shipment.1
To prevent such discrimination,2 courts have construed contracts of carriage
by which liability is allocated between consignor and consignee (generally
embodied in the uniform bill of lading) 3 so as to hold parties to a shipment
strictly liable for the charges.4 One result of this inflexible rule has been
the imposition of absolute liability for charges upon a party who is named
as consignee of a shipment, but reconsigns without accepting delivery.5 Dis-
satisfaction with this rule has produced a bill now pending in Congress to
give some relief to those shippers who consign to themselves and later recon-
sign.6 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, going even further than such
legislation, has in a recent case established the rule that any reconsignor can
limit his liability for freight charges.7
In this case a shipper had consigned several carloads of oil via the plaintiff
carrier, naming the defendant as consignee. While the shipment was still
in transit the defendant instructed the carrier to deliver to a reconsignee, but
to collect freight before delivery.8 Contrary to these instructions, a forty-eight
* New York Central R. R. v. Transamerican Petroleum Corp., 108 F. (2d) 994 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1940).
1. 24 STAT. 3S0 (1887), 49 U. S. C. §3(1) (1934); 34 STAT. 556 (1905), 49
U. S. C. § 6(7) (1934).
2. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59 (1924);
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919).
3. In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671 (1919). 64 1. C. C. 357 (1921).
See 4 WrLISTON, CoNTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 1073, 1031; ELLIOTT, BAIL IAE*S (2d eL
1929) § 207.
4. New York C. H. R. R. R. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U. S. 406 (1921); Pitts-
burgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919) (consignee) ; New York C.
R. R. v. Union Oil Co., 53 F. (2d) 1066 (W. D. Pa. 1931) (consignor); New Yorh
C. R. R. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, 137 N. E. 324 (1922) (reconsignor).
The so-called Newton Amendment [44 STAT. 1447 (1927), 49 U. S. C. §3(2) (1934)]
relieved from liability for freight charges those consignees who vere agents only and
not beneficial owners of the shipment.
5. New York C. R. R. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, 137 X. E.
324 (1922).
6. The Buck Bill, H. R. 5726, is designed to relieve from liability those shippers
who consign to themselves later to reconsign where instructions to the carrier to collect
before delivery are disobeyed. Hearings before a Subconmittee of the Commiiee on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce on H. R. 57.6, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (hereafter
cited as Hearings).
7. New York Central R. R. v. Transamerican Petroleum Corp., 103 F. (2d) 994
(C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
S. The reconsignment order wmas merely: "On arrival and %fithout extra expense
to us, please deliver these cars to the Independents Company." The court suggested that
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hour credit was allowed the reconsignee,9 who became bankrupt in the interim
and defaulted on the payment of the freight charge. Since the shipper was
free from liability by virtue of the "no-recourse" clause in the bill of lading,10
suit was brought against the reconsignor for the charges. The court, in holding
for the defendant, ruled that the act of reconsignment was not such an act
of dominion or ownership over the shipment as would constitute an implied
acceptance by the consignee of the bill of lading provisions that he would
pay the freight charges. The court further held that the failure to collect
from the ultimate consignee breached a contractual obligation assumed by the
carrier when it undertook to carry out the reconsigning instruction. Thus
the court repudiated the established rule that the reconsignor is liable for
charges despite instructions to collect before delivery.
The established rule was originally set forth in New York Central R. R. v.
Warren Ross Lumber Company." This and the many cases which followed
it imposed liability upon the reconsignor on the ground that reconsignment
was an act of dominion which raised, for all practical purposes, an irrebutable
presumption that the reconsignor was the "beneficial owner" of the shipment.
12
The reconsignor can be considered in his dual capacity: as consignee named
in the bill of lading, and as a shipper who ordered services from the carrier,U
A consignee is liable for freight charges on the presumption that the shipment
is made on his order and for his benefit as indicated by an act of ownership
and dominion- for example, acceptance of delivery. 14 The reconsignor was
there.was some room for doubt as to whether the reconsignment order included a direc-
tion to collect freight. But since it was so construed by the parties, the court acquiesced
in their interpretation. New York C. R. R. v. Transamerican Petroleum Corp., 108 F.
(2d) 994, 996 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
9. Although the Transportation Act of 1920 [41 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C.
§ 3 (2) (1934)] forbids the extension of credit except in extraordinary situations, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has made allowance for liberal credit to a carrier's custom-
ers who are on the carrier's credit list. Ex parte 73, 171 I. C. C. 268 (1930). See Lowden
v. Iroquois Coal Co., 18 F. Supp. 923, 924 (N. D. Ill. 1935).
10. See In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671, 740 (1919).
11. 234 N. Y. 261, 137 N. E. 324 (1922).
12. A previous decision in the Seventh Circuit, Wabash R. R. v. Horn, 40 F. (2d)
905 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), followed the Ross case, as have most courts. See cases collected
in Notes 105 A. L. R. 1216 (1936), 78 A. L. R. 926 (1932), 24 A. L. R. 1163 (1923).
See also Pennsylvania R. R. v. Seiter, 61 Ohio App. 497, 22 N. E. (2d) 843 (1939),
(1940) 38 MIcH. L. Rv. 895; New York C. R. R. v. Stanziale, 105 N. J. L. 593, 147
At. 457 (1929), (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 910.
13. Courts have usually discussed the reconsignor's liability in general terms without
explicitly analyzing his dual capacity. For a discussion of the liability of consignors and
consignees generally, see Watkins, Liability of Consignors and Consignees of Interstate
Shipments for Unpaid Freight Charges (1921) 6 MINN. L. REv. 23, Comment (1935) 45
YALE L. J. 142.
14. Union P. R. R. v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 202 Fed. 720 (C. C. A.
8th, 1912); Pennsylvania R. R. v. United Collieries, 59 Ohio App. 540, 18 N. E. (2d)
1000 (1938). Even where the consignee is not the "beneficial owner" of the shipment,
the surrender by the carrier of its lien on the shipment is said to operate as considera-
tion for an implied undertaking to pay the charges. Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. R. R. v.
Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919).
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held liable as consignee because of a similar act of ownership and dominion -
reconsigning.15
The reconsignor was also held liable to the carrier in his capacity as shipper.
Ordinarily a shipper is liable for freight charges as the party on whose
behalf and under whose direction the shipment is made.16 A shipper can,
however, by means of the "no-recourse" clause in the uniform bill of lading,
relieve himself of liability where the carrier delivers without collecting
charges.17 But no such bill of lading provision was made available to the
reconsignor.' s A shipper has also been said to be free to limit his liability
by contract, but contracts arising outside the bill of lading have seldom been
recognized. 19 Therefore most courts, in determining reconsignors' liability,
refused to acknowledge that a carrier, accepting a reconsignment order with
instructions to collect before delivery, assumed an implied contract obligation
to foilow these instructions."0 Even where it was conceded that an implied
obligation might arise from the carrier's undertaking, such a contract was
rendered ineffectual. Since a carrier cannot be estopped by its own negligence,
breach of contract or violation of instructions from collecting full freight
charges from any party liable,21 a reconsignor was denied the defenses of
estoppel2 and set-off 23 against the carrier's claim for freight charges. Thus
all efforts of the reconsignor to limit his liability as shipper were unsuccessful.
The decision of the principal case, repudiating these doctrines, was ap-
parently prompted by the harsh results of cases adopting the Ross rationale. -
15. See cases cited in Note 12 supra.
16. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Coal & Iron Co., 265 U. S. 59 (1924).
17. See note 10 mspra.
18. 'When the uniform bill of lading was adopted, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission expressly refused to provide a "no-recourse" blank for shippers who reconsign.
In the Matter of Bill of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671 (1919). Nor vas any blank provided for
ordinary reconsignment. See note 37 infra; Pennsylvania R. R. Y. United Collieries, 59
Ohio App. 540, 18 N. E. (2d) 1000 (193S).
19. See, for e.xample, 'Moss Lumber Co. v. Michigan C. R. R., 219 Ala. 593, 123
So. 90 (1929); cf. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. American Sahage & Supply Co., 19
S. W. (2d) 25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Lowden v. Iroquois Coal Co., 18 F. Supp. 923
(N. D. Ill. 1937).
20. The reconsigning instruction "freight charges to foliowv; owner or consignee to
pay charges," or equivalent language has been uniformly interpreted to constitute, not
an offer to the carrier, but rather a grant of an option under which the carrier is privi-
leged to collect before delivery. Ex parle 73, 171 I. C. C. 26S (1931) ; see cases collected
in Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 142, 147, n. 28.
21. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 2b5 U. S. 59, 05 (1924).
22. Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919).
23. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 125 Conn.
241, 5 A. (2d) 353 (1939), cert. denicd, 60 Sup. Ct. 79 (U. S. 1939); Pennsylvania R. R.
v. Marcelletti, 256 fich. 411, 240 N. NV. 4 (1932).
24. Courts have often admitted that the decisions imposing strict liability upon re-
consignors were harsh and inequitable, but have contended that such decisions were dic-
tated by necessity for a strict rule to prevent discrimination. See Central XWarehuuse v.
Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 20 F. (2d) 828, 8-9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), affg' 14 F. (2d) 123,
124 (D. Minn. 1926); Western & A. R. R. v. Underwood, 281 Fed. 891, S93 (N. D.
Ga. 1922). See also Baldwin v. Scott County 'Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 435 (1939).
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Time and again clear instructions to collect before delivery have been dis-
regarded by carriers who chose to extend credit to near-insolvents. Yet
the risk of loss resulting from such unauthorized extension of credit did not
fall upon the carrier, but upon the reconsignor. This inequity was aggravated
by the reconsignors' common practice of collecting the sales price less freight
by order bill of lading, relying upon the carrier to collect the freight.2 5 Thus
failure of the carrier to collect on delivery before the insolvency of the
deliveree imposed upon the reconsignor a double freight charge burden. 20
The rule was particularly harsh for reconsignors who, although only com-
mission agents with a small and fleeting interest in shipments which they
never owned, were often held for the underpayments and defaults of recon-
signees to whom credit had been extended contrary to instructions. 27
The Ross rule imposed an equally harsh burden upon the producer of
perishables who shipped "open"-naming himself or his agent as consignee-
and subsequently diverted the shipment to a buyer found while the shipment
was still in transit.2 8 The efforts of "open" shippers to protect themselves
against a carrier's violation of instructions to deliver collect were consistently
frustrated. Those who left the "no-recourse" clause unsigned were held
liable like any shipper whose consignee defaults. 29 But even those who did
sign and, in addition, reconsigned with instructions to collect before delivery,
were nonetheless liable in the role of reconsignor.3°
Courts adhering to the Ross rule found justification for these inequities
in the necessity for a strict rule to prevent discrimination.31 This is not
convincing, however, because under the Ross rule the carrier had an oppor-
tunity to discriminate by exercising his choice to collect freight charges from
either reconsignor or reconsignee. The principal case, on the other hand,
seems to foreclose any opportunity to discriminate because the carrier's only
choice is to release the reconsignor from liability by delivering to the recon-
signee without collecting; thereupon, the reconsignee automatically assumes
responsibility for the freight charges by accepting delivery.3 2 Furthermore,
25. New York C. R. R. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal and Iron Co., 286 III. 267, 268,
121 N. E. 581, 582 (1918); Hearings p. 7.
26. Hearings p. 7.
27. The Newton Amendment, note 4 supra, has been construed so as not to relieve
from freight charge liability those reconsignors who are not "beneficial owners" of the
shipment, but rather agents of the owners. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lord & Spencer, 295
Mass. 179, 3 N. E. (2d) 231 (1936); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Rothstein, 109 Pa. Super.
Ct. 96, 165 Atl. 752 (1933), 116 Pa. Super. Ct. 156, 176 Ad. 861 (1935).
28. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 125 Conn.
241, 5 A. (2d) 353 (1939), cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 79 (U. S. 1939) ; New York Cen-
tral R. R. v. Frank H. Buck Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 384, 41 P. (2d) 547 (1935) ; Erie R. R. v.
H. Rosenstein, 249 N. Y. 241, 164 N. E. 37 (1928), (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 989, (1929)
29 COL. L. REv. 521.
29. New York C. R. R. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal and Iron Co., 286 I11. 267, 121
N. E. 581 (1918).
30. New York C. R. R. v. Little-Jones Coal Co., 25 F. Supp. 337 (N. D. I11. 1938).
31. See note 24 supra.
32. See page 1458 supra. These considerations are similarly applicable to ultimate
consignees, sometimes termed reconsignees.
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the power which the carrier possessed under the Ross rule to protect favored
customers or to injure the unfavored by unrestricted dispensation of their
credit, would seem to be removed. Lastly, a substantial discrimination in the
availability of the "no-recourse" privilege to shippers who consign "open"
and to shippers who consign directly seems to be eliminated.-
In adopting a rule that eliminates the inequities of the Ross rule without
permitting discrimination, the court in the principal case utilized conceptual
devices which are not novel,34 and which are certainly as plausible as the
logic of the Ross rule. The instruction to collect before delivery was inter-
preted as a manifestation which rebutted the presumption of ownership and
liability raised by a bare reconsigning. It was further held that a reconsign-
ment with directions to collect before delivery was not the absolute acceptance
of liability from which there was no escape by contract or by estoppel of
the carrier, but was rather a conditional acceptance - conditional upon the
carrier's execution of instructions. To implement this conditional acceptance
the court constructed an implied reconsignment contract. Where other courts
had found only implied contracts which imposed liability for freight charges,
this court found an implied contract which limits and conditions liabilit-.
A possible criticism of the decision is that, by recognizing manifestations
which are not operative to condition a shipper's liability, it conveys to the
reconsignor a privilege greater than that of shippers who sign the "no-
recourse" clause.35 When a shipper signs a bill of lading, however, he ex-
pressly contracts to assume liability. At the same time, the "no-recourse"
clause is available to him to make a clear demonstration of an intention to
limit that liability. There is little reason, therefore, to give weight to any
other manifestation of intention. On the other hand, since no express instru-
ment is signed by the reconsignor,30 a lesser manifestation of condition must
be recognized in order to give the reconsignor the equivalent of a "no-
recourse" clause.
Another objection to the decision might be that it imposes upon the carrier
a risk of the reconsignor's business.3 7 But the carrier has ample opportunity
33. See page 1460 .rpra.
34. See 2 HuTcuISON ON CARRIERS (3d ed. 1906) § 803; ELUTTrr, BAILMNLTS (2d
ed. 1929) § 207, 4 ELLioTr oN RAmRoAs (3d ed. 1926) § 873. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Southern Coal, Coke & Mining Co., 254 Ill. App. 238 (1929), ccrl. dcnicd, 2,2 U. S.
860 (1930) ; Wallingford v. Buck, 255 Fed. 949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) ; Pere Marquette
R. R. v. American Coal & Supply Co., 239 Ill. App. 139 (1929); Erie R. R. v. Price, 11
Ohio L. Abs. 656 (1931).
35. It has been readily conceded that such a manifestation might be made operative.
New York C. R. R. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, 2k*2, 137 N. E. 324, 325
(1922); Pennsylvania R. R. v. United Collieries, 59 Ohio App. 540, 544, 18 N. E. (2d)
1000, 1001 (1930). This court disagrees with others only in that it gives effect to the
indicia here presented. See notes 8 and 20 supra.
36. See page 1459 supra.
37. Provision for a "no-recourse" blank for shippers who reconsign w%-as originally
denied by the Interstate Commerce Commission on the ground that such a privilege would
force the carrier "to assume risks for the convenience of the consignor which would have
no direct relationship to its service of transportation." In the Matter of the Bills of Lad-
ing, 52 I. C. C. 671, 722 (1919). But apparently the Commission no longer maintains
this view. See letter from Interstate Commerce Commission, Hcarings p. 4.
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to protect itself. It is privileged to demand pre-payment of the charge from
the reconsignor. 38 If the carrier does not demand pre-payment, its lien upon
the shipment is not surrendered by reconsignment, but is retained until
delivery. In such a case, the carrier is not only privileged but requested to
collect before delivery and surrender of the lien. If the reconsignee refuses
to pay or to accept delivery, the carrier has recourse against the reconsignor,
if not against the original shipper. 39 Even where the delivery is made on
credit, collection can and must be made by the carrier from the accepting
reconsignee.40 Furthermore, a carrier could readily require bond from de-
liverees where, contrary to instructions, the carrier persists in making delivery
without collection.
The court in the principal case, by extending protection to the reconsignor,
has reached an equitable solution to the problem of allocating liability for
freight charges. Two problems are left, however, by the new rule. In the
first place, liability must be determined by the manifestation of intention as
indicated by instructions from the reconsignor to the carrier. This may well
leave uncertainty among carriers and reconsignors as to what manifestation
is sufficient to limit the liability of the reconsignor. A solution of this problem
could probably be provided by a ruling of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission adopting a uniform reconsignment order with a "no-recourse" clause. 41
In the second place, there still remains a conflict among jurisdictions which
runs counter to the policy of uniformity in the regulation of interstate carriers.
Solution of this problem would seem to require either a decision of the Su-
preme Court resolving the present conflict, 42 or an act of Congress which
would permit reconsignors to limit their liability.43
38. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59, 66 (1924);
Wadley S. Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 656 (1915).
39. The language of the principal case might permit the argument that the recon-
signor never assumes liability, and therefore is free from liability even where the recon-
signee refuses to accept delivery. But the implied contract which the court constructs
from the reconsigning order would seem adequate to hold the reconsignor where the car-
rier attempts to obey the reconsigning instructions, and is frustrated by the refusal of
the reconsignee to accept delivery. It should also be noted that the original shipper may
well be subject at least to secondary liability in such a case despite his signing of the
"no-recourse" clause. See p. 1460 supra. But ef. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central Iron
& Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59 (1924).
40. See notes 1, 14 and 20 supra.
41. The Interstate Commerce Commission would seem to have authority to make
available a reconsigning blank. See In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671, 686
(1919) ; Missouri P. R. R. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341, 345 (1926).
42. There is no indication that the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict very soon,
for certiorari has been denied in cases representing both rules: New York, N. H. & H.
R. R. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 125 Conn. 241, 5 A. (2d) 353 (1939), ceri.
denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 79 (U. S. 1939) (follows the Ross case) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Southern Coal, Coke and Mining Co., 254 Ill. App. 238 (1929), cert. denied, 282 U. S.
860 (1930) (does not impose liability upon a reconsignor).
43. This would involve an extension of the Buck Bill [note 6 supra] so as to apply
not only to shippers who consign to themselves and later reconsign, but to all recon-
signors.
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SUPREME COURT DISPOSITION OF STATE DECISIONS
INVOLVING NON-FEDERAL QUESTIONS*
THE appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions of state
courts has been consistently limited to questions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States.' Non-federal matters may not
be assigned as error in such appeals, even if they arise in the same case with
federal questions. As a practical corollary, where the state decision is deemed
to rest upon a non-federal ground, independent and adequate of itself to
support the judgment, the Supreme Court will normally decline to review
at all. In such a case it is thought that reversal for error in the decision of
any federal questions involved would be "useless and profitless," 2 since the
state court could thereafter enter the sane judgment upon the non-federal
ground alone.
While the rule limiting the Court to review of federal questions is grounded
upon basic requirements of a dual government, its corollary partakes of no
such sanctity. It was originated by the Court simply as a convenient canon
of self-limitation.3 In most cases the practice makes for justice and efficiency.
Cases where the state decision has coupled a gratuitous ruling under the
federal constitution with the construction of a state statute, of some matter
of procedure or of a common-law principle which supports the judgment quite
independently of the federal question, 4 are adequately disposed of upon the
non-federal ground rule, without decision of the federal question.
Until recent years, this practice has been considered discretionary rather
than mandatory. The leading and most frequently cited case in the field,
after a lengthy survey, originally established the unqualified proposition that
every federal question of importance actually decided by the state court
should be reviewed and decided by the Supreme Court.5 Only if the federal
question were incorrectly decided below- and obviously this presupposed an
* Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 676 (U. S. 1940).
1. Section 25 of the original judiciary Act specifically so provided: "But no other
error shall be assigned or regarded as ground for reversal in any such case as aforesaid
than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before men-
tioned questions of validity or construction of the said [Federal] constitution, treaties,
statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute." 1 ST.,T. 85 (1789). This section has
been omitted from all subsequent Judiciary Acts 114 STAT. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C. § 344
(1934)] but its substance has been continued by judicial construction. Murdock v. Mem-
phis, 20 Wall. 590 (U. S. 1874).
2. ROBERTSON AND KIRHAM., JURISDICTION OF THE SUPIRE I Courr (1936) § 84.
3. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. (U. S. 1874) 590. At that time the Judiciary
Act permitted review only when the federal claim had been denied, but that limitation
does not affect the application of the non-federal ground rule. 14 Si,-r. 385 (1867).
4. Hallanan v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 261 U. S. 393 (1923) (separability of state-
statute); New York ex reL Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U. S. 590 (1923) (effect of writ of
habeas corpus); Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U. S. 106 (1934) (estoppel). For an ex-
treme case, see Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 255 U. S. 445 (1921). Cf.
Fox Film Co. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207 (1935) (contract violating Sherman Act and
common law).
5. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (U. S. 1874).
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examination of the merits -would the Court look for an independent non-
federal ground adequate to support the judgment and prevent reversal in
spite of the federal error.0 Under this view the non-federal ground concept
was used as a test for determining the disposition of a case after jurisdiction
had been taken rather than as a test of jurisdiction itself. The presence of
a non-federal question might require affirmance of a judgment containing
federal error, but would not bar the assumption of jurisdiction to expose
and correct that error. Gradually, for reasons of dispatch and convenience,
it became customary for the Supreme Court, in cases involving non-federal
questions, to dismiss the appeal instead of affirming the state judgment. 7
And since the adoption of Supreme Court Rule 12,8 under which the appellant
is required to submit a jurisdictional statement prior to oral argument, this
practice has become uniform. Consequently, the Supreme Court today rarely
allows appeals containing non-federal questions to reach the stage of argu-
ment upon the merits.9
If the non-federal ground rule could be applied to varying factual situa-
tions as automatically as it is invoked by the Court to dispose of them, no
great problems would arise. But the rule is complicated by the existence
of three well-recognized though ill-defined exceptions. Where the non-federal
ground is "interwoven" with the federal ground,10 where it is unsubstantial11
or untenable,' 2 or where the non-federal ground, though present, was not
actually decided by the state court13 the Supreme Court will review. What
actually suffices to bring a case within each of these exceptions is a difficult
problem.
One situation which the Supreme Court has failed to recognize as an
exception to the non-federal ground rule, and which causes great logical and
practical difficulty, is that created when a state court construes identical
provisions of the state and federal constitutions upon the exclusive authority
of federal cases. Technically, of course, the state and federal grounds in
such a situation are completely independent, since the state court is the final
6. Id. at 636 (proposition No. 6).
7. Typical of the opinions before 1928 is the following: "In cases where the state
court has decided a local question adequate to support its judgment this court has some-
times affirmed and sometimes dismissed the writ of error [cases]. We have again con-
sidered the matter and have concluded that, generally at least, it is better practice to
dismiss." [Italics added]. Live Oak Water Users' Ass'n v. Railroad Comm., 269 U. S.
354, 359 (1926) ; see Southern Pac. Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601, 610 (1913). Contra:
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181 (1922).
8. 275 U. S. 603 (1928), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 354 (Supp. 1940).
9. Frankfurter and Fisher, Business of Supreme Court-.1935 and 1936 Terms,
51 H~Av. L. Rv. 577, 581, et seq.
10. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931) ; see Enterprise Irrig. Dist. v.
Farmers' Mut. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164 (1917).
11. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
12. Ward v. Love County Bd. of Comm'rs, 253 U. S. 17 (1920). The Supreme Court
has not allowed states to put unreasonable procedural obstacles in the way of a suitor
claiming a federal right. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22 (1923).
13. Grayson v. Harris, 267 U. S. 352 (1925); State of Indiana e.r rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U. S. 95 (1938) ; Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15 (1934).
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authority upon the construction of its own constitution and may properly
give to certain words a meaning at variance with that attached to the same
words in the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court.14 But frequently
it seems that the state court reasons from the major premise of the federal
cases and the minor premise of the identity between the provisions of both
constitutions, to an interpretation of the state constitution which is obviously
not "independent."[;
Where this sort of interdependence between the state and federal grounds
appears in the state decision, an automatic application of the non-federal
ground rule which forecloses review by the Supreme Court is highly unsatis-
factory. For example, in Lynch v. NAew York ex rel. Pierson, the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court had annulled a tax assessment
for violation of due process,'0 citing eight Supreme Court cases on the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, lT
and the Supreme Court, after granting certiorari for importance, dismissed
the writ as improvidently granted, saying that its jurisdiction could not be
founded upon the "surmise" that the state decision rested upon the federal
ground rather than upon the due process clause of the state constitution.Ys
In New York City v. Central Savings Bank,'0 the amended remittitur of the
New York court even more clearly indicated that its decision was based
primarily, if not wholly, upon the federal question: "Our conclusion that the
statute is repugnant to Art. I, Sec. 6 of the state constitution followed neces-
sarily from our determination that, in accordance with a long line of decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, the statute is repugnant to the
Federal Constitution."2 0 But the Supreme Court declined, upon the authority
of cases stating the non-federal ground rule, to issue a writ of certiorari.2 1
A recent case2 2 illustrates a novel variation upon this theme. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court held the Minnesota graduated gross sales tax2 on chain
stores invalid under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the uniformity clause of the state constitution,2 4 which, it -said,
14. The same is true of federal and state statutes. Cf. Detroit & Mackinac Ry. v.
Paper Co., 248 U. S. 30, 31 (1918).
15. New York City v. Central Savings Bank, 280 N. Y. 9, 19 N. E. (t2d 659 (1939);
see note 20 and accompanying text infra.
16. 237 App. Div. 763, 263 N. Y. Supp. 259 (3d Dep't 1933).
17. 263 N. Y. 533, 189 N. E. 684 (1933).
18. 293 U. S. 52 (1934).
19. 306 U. S. 661 (1939).
20. [Italics added.] 280 N. Y. 9, 19 N. E. (2d) 659 (1939).
21. The case of Morehead v. New York ex te. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (1936) is
apparently inconsistent with the Lynch and Ccntral Saings cases. Although the New
York Court of Appeals had explicitly declared a statute invalid under both due process
clauses, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction to review, possibly because the respondent
did not contest jurisdiction and because the sole authority for the New York decision
was a controversial Supreme Court case.
22. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 676 (U. S. 1940).
23. Minn. Laws 1933, c. 213. The gross sales feature of the tax %%as suspended for
four years in 1937. MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §§ 5887-1 to 58S7-18.
24. MNxN. CoNsT. Art. 9, § 1.
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imposed "identical restrictions" upon the legislative power of the state with
respect to tax classification.25 After brief mention of three Minnesota decisions
broadly interpreting the uniformity clause,20 the court declared that the precise
question had been directly passed on in five cases,2 7 "which it is our duty
to follow."' 28 Two of these were Supreme Court cases and all were concerned
solely with the Fourteenth Amendment. The syllabus prepared by the court
declared the tax invalid under both constitutions. Reviewing on certiorari,
and disregarding this syllabus, 2 9 the Supreme Court expressed doubt as to
the precise grounds for the state decision, intimating its belief that "the
federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the decision." It vacated
the judgment and remanded the cause to the Minnesota court for further
proceedings to remove "obscurities and ambiguities." Three Justices dissented,
stating that there was an independent non-federal ground requiring dismissal
of the writ upon the authority of the Central Savings case.a0
Although the attempt of the majority to distinguish the Central Savings
case was thoroughly unconvincing,3 ' there is authority for the procedure of
vacating and remanding in analogous situations. It has been done where
there were supervening changes of law8 2 or of fact8 3 before argument on
appeal, where the precise nature of the asserted federal claim was uncertain, 4
25. National Tea Co. v. State, 205 Minn. 443, 447, 286 N. W. 360, 362 (1939); see
Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577, 581 (1926); Reed v. Bjorn-
son, 191 Minn. 254, 260, 253 N. W. 102, 105 (1934).
26. State v. Minnesota Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Minn. 231, 176 N. W. 756 (1920);
State ex rel. Mudeking v. Parr, 109 Minn. 147, 123 N. W. 408 (1909) ; In re Improve-
ment of Third St., 185 Minn. 170, 240 N. W. 355 (1932).
27. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935); Great A. & P. Tea
Co. v. Valentine, 12 F. Supp. 760 (S. D. Iowa 1935), aff'd per curiarn, 299 U. S. 32
(1936); Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 506, 261 N. W. 20, cert. denied, 296 U.
S. 625 (1935) ; Lane Drug Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 11 F. Supp. 672 (N. D. Fla. 1935) ; Great
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Harvey, 107 Vt. 215, 177 Atl. 423 (1935).
28. National Tea Co. v. State, 205 Minn. 443, 451, 286 N. W. 360, 364 (1939).
29. By statute the Minnesota Court is required to prepare the syllabus [MINN. STAT.
(Mason 1927) § 134], but it does not become, as in some other states, the law of the case.
Cf. State v. Hauser, 101 Ohio St. 404, 407, 131 N. E. 66, 67 (1920). The Supreme Court
is reluctant to look outside the official state opinion for the establishment of jurisdictional
facts. See Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 20-21 (1937) (certificate by state judge) ;
Live Oak Water Users' Ass'n v. Railroad Comm., 269 U. S. 354, 357-359 (1926) (briefs
and oral argument); cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 360-362 (1927) (certifi-
cate signed by all state judges becomes part of record).
30. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 676, 680 (U. S. 1940).
31. Id. at 679. Mr. Justice Douglas cited Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y.
271, 317, 94 N. E. 431, 448 (1911) for the proposition that New York prefers its own
interpretation of due process. He might have cited Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254,
260,. 253 N. W. 102, 105 (1934) for the same proposition in Minnesota. Such general
acknowledgements of a technical rule permitting state and federal laws to be interpreted
independently should not constitute a jurisdictional bar to Supreme Court review in cases
where they are not interpreted independently. The Central Savings case itself contains
language directly contradicting the Ives dictum. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
32. Gulf, Colorado Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503 (1912).
33. Pagel v. MacLean, 283 U. S. 266 (1931).
34. Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14 (1937).
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where the record did not adequately show the facts underlying the state
decision,3 5 and even where, without any strictly technical justification, the
Court invoked its general power to "make such disposition of the case as
justice requires."38  Procedurally the disposition of the Nalional Tea case
is justifiable.3 7
The professed aim of the decision, however, was to ensure that "the respon-
sibility for striking down or upholding state legislation be fairly placed"3 3
(i.e., on the state court or the Supreme Court). Considerations of policy in
a federated nation would seem to require either that identical clauses in federal
and state constitutions be interpreted harmoniously, following the persuasion
of the Supreme Court, or that a sharply visible line of distinction be drawn
between different interpretations where harmony is impossible. But in this
case the procedure of vacation and remand without decision of the federal
question served merely to divide the responsibility, to deny the Supreme
Court's opportunity for leadership, and to blur a possible distinction between
state and federal interpretations of "equal protection" in taxation. It has
thrown back to the Minnesota court an impossible hypothetical question:
would an unspecified change in the federal decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment alter that court's decision under the uniformity clause?
In the absence of any Supreme Court ruling upon the federal question, the
Minnesota court may now, upon remand, do any one of several things.30
It may invalidate the tax again solely upon the state constitution or other
non-federal ground, foreclosing further review.40 It may erase the state con-
stitutional question entirely from its opinion, preferring to rest wholly upon
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 A third possi-
bility is an honest reaffirmance upon both state and federal grounds, using
the same federal authorities. But this would merely re-create the identical
problem upon a second application to the Supreme Court. There would still
be the suspicion that federal cases of rather doubtful present-day validity
controlled the judgment, not technically as a matter of power, but actually
35. Villa v. Van Schaick, 299 U. S. 152 (1936).
36. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600 (1934) ; see State Tax Comm. v. Van Cott,
306 U. S. 511, 515 (1939).
37. Another procedure with precisely the advantages and disadvantages of that
employed in the instant case was used in a similar situation. Respondent obtained a tvwo
week's continuance from the Supreme Court to enable the state court to amend its opin-
ion. International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Surety Co., 297 U. S. 657, 662 (1936).
38. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 676, 679 (U. S. 1940).
39. The effect of such a remand is to reinvest the state court with full authority over
the case. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Concannon, 239 U. S. 382 (1915); Siou: City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923).
40. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 297 U. S. 620 (1936); Hanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Carr (Harding), 272 U. S. 494 (1926). Schneider Granite Co. v. Gast Realty &
Investment Co., 245 U. S. 288 (1917). These cases should dispose of the myth that a
Supreme Court decision mulst be decisive of the particular litigation.
41. This is unlikely, however, in view of the court's commitment in the syllabus
of its first opinion. Cf. Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 2Q3 U. S. 15 (1934) vwhere
this was done in the state court's original opinion and the Supreme Court too!: juris-
diction to review.
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as a matter of reason and persuasion; and there would still be the difficulty
of getting around the rule of the Central Savings case to secure Supreme
Court review.
Quite apart from the relatively unimportant question of whether the state
court did or did not actually come to a conclusion based upon the state con-
stitution (which is apparently the basis upon which the National Tea case
opinion distinguished the Central Savings case) is the broader question of
what the Supreme Court can do with a state decision in which the non-
federal ground is frankly based upon federal law and cases. Intelligent
disposition of this type of case would be greatly facilitated by the Supreme
Court's deciding the federal question before remanding. If, as seems often
the case, the state court had previously felt "bound" by the federal prece-
dents, such a decision would settle the case. If the state court now preferred
to differ explicitly with the Supreme Court in interpreting its own consti-
tution, it would still be free to do so. In either event the responsibility for
striking down or upholding state legislation would be distinctly placed. In
times of Constitutional change this suggested procedure is particularly valuable
in preventing state courts from transferring the onus of their judgments to
federal cases which might be overruled or modified if the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to reconsider them.42
The only jurisdictional difficulties with this course arise from the recent
tendency to treat the non-federal ground rule as an automatic test of juris-
diction- a view which finds no statutory support and which is at variance
with dicta and holding in almost every case prior to Supreme Court Rule
12.43 Despite expressions in the National Tea case to the contrary, no rule
other than a rule of convenience forbids decision of the federal question.44
By analogy to- cases in which the federal and non-federal grounds are
"interwoven" jurisdiction could be convincingly maintained where, as here,
the non-federal ground arises only as a result of the persuasion of federal
authority. Moreover, such a course would seem much better calculated than
the present rule to implement the high purpose of the Court as expressed
by its present Chief Justice: "Review by the Supreme Court is thus in the
interest of the law, its appropriate exposition and enforcement, not in the
mere interest of the litigants."' 45
Basic constitutional doctrines touching the division of authority between
state and federal courts are not to be lightly disturbed. But the non-federal
ground rule concerns the needs of practical and politic administration rather
than the substance of these doctrines. The real issue raised by the National
42. Cf. Van Cott v. State Tax Comm., 96 P. (2d) 740 (1939); Georgia Power Co.
v. Decatur, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S. E. 32 (1935).
43. See note 7 supra. Within very recent years cases have been both reversed and
affirmed, apparently following the earlier methodology, despite the presence of non-fed-
eral grounds. Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Nat'l Bank, 295 U. S. 209 (1935) (affirmed) ;
Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600 (1934) (reversed) ; Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order
v. Michaux, 279 U. S. 737 (1929) (reversed).
44. See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 676, 680 (U. S. 1940).
45. Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler. SEN. REP. No. 711, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 38, 39; 81 Coac. REC. 3607 (1937).
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Tea case is not which court should have the final word, but what procedure
will best ensure that each court fulfills its allotted constitutional function.
It is a problem best to be settled as a matter of policy in particular cases,
not in terms of a rigid jurisdictional4 rule.
EXPULSION FROM STOCK EXCHANGES AS A CHECK TO MATCHED
ORDERS AND OTHER MARKET MANIPULATION
SECTION 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 designed to afford
investors a more effective protection against market manipulation than was
provided at common law,2 has formed the spearhead of a campaign by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to make market price a resultant of
bona fide supply and demand.3 Most comprehensive of the legislative bans
is Section 9(a) (2), which prohibits creation of trading activity or raising
or depressing of prices for the purpose of inducing others into or out of the
market. Price-pegging- a less opprobrious and sometimes necessary 4 form
46. For an interesting defense of jurisdictional flexibility see Frankfurter, Supreme
Court at October Term, 1934 (1935) 49 HaRv. L. Rzv. 68, 94.
*Charles C. Wright v. Securities and Exchange Comm., N. Y. Times, May 21, 1940,
p. 35, col. 7 (C. C. A. 2d).
1. 48 STAT. 889, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (1934).
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 probably effects little change upon the
common law itself. Its chief value lies in synthesizing the common law, doctrines and
in providing an effective machinery for their enforcement. Berle, Liability for Stock
Market Manipulation (1931) 31 CoL- L. REv. 264; Berle, Stock Market Manipilation
(1938) 38 Coi- L. Rv. 393; Moore, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act (1934)
2 U. OF CEL L. Rmv. 46. The common law in this country is discussed in Brown v.
United States, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935), cert. denied sub nora. McCarthy v. United States, 296 U. S. 650 (1936).
3. The SEC, in attacking manipulation, has also made use of the fraud provisions
of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77 (1934),
and of the Federal Mail Fraud Act, 35 STAT. 1130 (1909), 1S U. S. C. §338 (1934).
Seeman v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); United States v. Rollnid:,
91 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). The provisions of the Securities Act and the
Mail Fraud Act have been joined in criminal indictments. United States v. Alluan et al.,
13 F. Supp. 289 (N. D. Tex. 1936); United States v. Bogy, 16 F. Supp. 407 (W. D.
Tenn. 1936), aff'd, 96 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. COS
(1938); Coplin v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied,
301 U. S. 703 (1937). The fraud provisions of the 1933 Act have also been used in
conjunction with § 9(a) (2) of the 1934 Act. S.E.C. v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S. D.
N. Y. 1936), rev'd, 87 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), ini. ent'd., 22 F. Supp. 692
(S. D. N. Y. 1938); S.E.C. v. Otis & Co., 18 F. Supp. 100 (N. D. Ohio 1936), aff'd,
106 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939); R. J. Koeppe & Co. v. S.E.C., 95 F. (2d) 550
(C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
4. For discussion of the desirability of price-pegging to facilitate primary distri-
bution of securities by undervriters, see SEC Exchange Act Release No. 2446, Mar.
18, 1940, 3 et seq. TwiENaiErH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MAnutKs (1935) 69 et
seq., 500.
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of manipulation - though not outlawed, is placed under the strict surveillance
of the Commission5 by Section 9(a) (6). Matched orders and wash sales
are expressly banned by Section 9(a) (1) ." The sanctions provided to en-
force these substantive provisions include criminal prosecutions started by the
Department of Justice at the instigation of the Commission, 7 suits for injunc-
tion brought by the Commission in the district court,8 and hearings before
the Commission leading to orders, reviewable by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
suspending for not more than a year or expelling members from national
securities exchanges.' 0
Since all manipulation cases brought to the courts under the Exchange
Act have been disposed of under Section 9(a) (2), 11 the matched order
provision has not received judicial construction. Uninterpreted, also, has been
the scope of the Commission's power to expel or suspend members from
national securities exchanges. Recently, however, a case posing the dual
problem of construing the matched order provision and determining the
effect to be given an expulsion order was decided by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.12 The Commission's expulsion order was predicated upon
a finding that the appellant Wright had manipulated the common stock of
the Kinner Corporation on the Los Angeles Stock Exchange in violation
of Sections 9(a) (1) and 9(a) (2). 13 Just prior to Wright's market activity,
while the price stood at 45 cents, two of his associates 14 acquired an option
on 160,000 shares of Kinner stock at prices increasing from 45 to 60 cents
per share. During the first day, Wright purchased, through controlled
accounts, 18,500 shares at prices rising from 46 to 60, and sold 9,000 shares
5. The SEC has recently promulgated its first set of rules under this subsection,
covering stabilizing operations on securities offered at the market price. Rules X-9A6-1
to X-9A6-6, 135 C. C. H. St. Exch. Regul. Serv. If15162-5166. See Comment (1940)
28 CALIF. L. REv. 378, 383. For a statement of the policy underlying these rules, see
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 2446, Mar. 18, 1940.
6. A "matched order" is entered at substantially the same price, time, and size as a
countervailing buy or sell order so that the two may cross and create a fictitious picture
of activity upon the tape. A "wash sale" results where the operator is at once the
buyer and seller, so that no change of beneficial ownership occurs.
7. § 32, 48 STAT. 904, 15 U. S. C. § 78ff (1934).
8. § 21(e), 48 STAT. 900, 15 U. S. C. §78u(e) (1934).
9. § 25(a), 48 STAT. 901, 15 U. S. C. §78y(a) (1934).
10. § 19(a) (3), 48 STAT. 898, 15 U. S. C. § 78s (1934).
11. See § 9(a) (2) cases cited note 3 supra. Other cases brought under § 9(a) (2)
include S.E.C. v. Saphier, 135 C. C. H. St. Exch. Regul. Serv. 118529 (S. D. N. Y.
1936); S.E.C. v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
12. Charles C. Wright v. Securities and Exchange Comm., N. Y. Times, May 21,
1940, p. 35, col. 7 (C. C. A. 2d).
13. In Matter of Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190 (1938).
14. Norman Stern and Herbert King, the holders of the option, were charged with
acting in concert with Wright, and the three were joined in the proceedings before
the SEC. Upon a finding that they had conspired with Wright in violating § 9(a) (2),
Stern and King were each suspended for twelve months from membership in exchanges.
In Matter of Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190, 216 (1938). No appeal was brought
from those orders.
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at prices ranging from 55 to 60. The trading volume which previously had
averaged only 730 shares a day surged to 36,800 shares. During the four
succeeding trading days, through a nominal account, he sold 41,300 addi-
tional shares at prices ranging from 623/ to 75; 40,000 of these shares were
obtained under the option. Thus the market price rose from 45 cents to
75 cents in a five day period during which Wright's purchases represented
79% of the total purchases on the exchange, and his sales 40% of total sales.
On these findings of fact by the Commission the court sustained10 the holding
that Wright had violated Section 9(a) (2) by creating trading activity in-
tended to enable him to unload the option stock upon investors at a profit.
The transactions alleged to constitute matched orders occurred on the first
day. At 1:30 P.M., Wright entered through a discretionary account an order
to sell 10,000 shares at 60. Ninety minutes later, the market having fallen
to 57Y2 before any of that order had been executed, Wright entered a second
order through another controlled account' 0 to buy 2500 shares "at market."
Both of these orders were entered upon his own initiative despite notice
from his Los Angeles broker that a cross was likely to occur. The buy order
was executed: 100 shares at 57Y, and 2,400 at 60, of which 800 were from
Wright's own sell order.' 7
The matched order section provides:
"It shall be unlawful . . . for the purpose of creating a false or
misleading appearance of active trading in any security registered
. . . to enter an order for the purchase of such security with the
knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size,
at substantially the same time, and at substantially the same price,
for the sale of any such security, has been or will be entered by or
for the same or different parties."
In construing this provision, the Commission pointed out that the statute
prohibits, not the actual crossing of matched orders, but the entry of an order
15. A portion of the hearings before the trial examiner was removed from Wash-
ington to Los Angeles and thereafter to San Francisco. Wright did not attend these
hearings, and contended that this removal to a point so distant deprived him of due
process of law. As to the Los Angeles hearing Wright had notice, and the court held
it a proper exercise of discretion by the SEC to order hearings conducted where
numerous witnesses and original records of market transactions were located. Wright
had no notice, however, of the transfer of hearings from Los Angeles to San Francisco,
and the court held this "could not be condoned if the evidence taken at San Francisco
were essential to sustain the order." But since the testimony was not indispensable to the
case, and the Commission so stated in its findings, the court held this vs not reversible
error.
16. The device of operating through controlled accounts instead of in his own
name prevented these orders from falling into the category of "wash sales." Their effect
from Wright's point of view, however, was close to that of "wash sles," since his
complete control over the transactions rendered the change in beneficial ownership little
more than nominal.
17. A second matched order was found by the Commission to have occurred at
4 P.M., when Wright placed through a different broker a market order to buy 2,550
shares for his wife's account. This crossed, to the extent of 2,200 shares the unfilled
portion of his prior order to sell 10,000 shares at 60.
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under such circumstances that it may reasonably be expected to result in a
fictitious picture. A violation thus occurs not upon the execution, but upon
the entry of the order. The Commission contended, however, that the fact
of an actual crossing might conclusively demonstrate that the orders had the
similarity of size, time and price required to bring them within the statutory
ambit. In finding that the orders met the requirement as to price, the Com-
mission argued that when Wright entered his market buy order, he knew
that it would "clean up"'8 all the stock offered at 572 and that, as to a
portion of the order, "market" and "60" would be the same. Hence, with
regard to the 800 shares that actually crossed, the Commission contended
that Wright bid "60" just as truly as if he had phrased the order in terms
of that specific price. Proof of the requisite identity of time presented a more
difficult problem. The Commission argued that the ninety-minute interim
between the buy and sell orders was small compared to the time consumed
by the manipulation as a whole; and that the orders were close enough to
achieve Wright's purpose. In addition, focussing upon the statutory wording
"enter an order," the SEC viewed Wright's order as being continuously
offered by the broker until execution. The Commission's position with rela-
tion to size was based upon the exchange practice of considering orders not
designated "all or none" as divisible into 100 share lots.'9 Under that view
Wright's orders became, in effect, 100 orders to sell 100 shares, and 25 orders
to buy 100 shares. The alleged matching occurred between eight of these
orders in 100 share lots.
The court, disagreeing with the Commission's interpretation of "substan-
tially the same size," turned the case on that point, without taking a position
with respect to identity of price or time. Although conceding the soundness
of the Commission's assumption that Wright knew of the exchange practice
of splitting orders into 100 share lots, the court held that the evidence sup-
plied by a 10,000 share sell order and a 2,500 share buy order was insufficient
to support a finding of substantial identity of size. The holding is probably
supported by the statutory view that matched orders are particularly repre-
hensible because they represent a riskless device for stimulating market
activity and creating an artificial price. Where identical countervailing orders
are placed simultaneously in controlled accounts, risk of loss to the manipula-
tor may be completely eliminated. To the extent, however, that orders vary
in price, time and size, the risk that the crossing will be intercepted by out-
side orders and that the manipulator will be forced to take a position increases.
18. "Clean up" is an expression used on the Exchange to denote the purchase of
all the stock offered in the market at a particular price.
19. It is settled both in law and in exchange practice that an order to a broker
to buy or sell securities is severable and, in the absence of contrary agreement or
instruction, authorizes the broker to execute the order to whatever extent he finds
possible. Marye v. Strouse, 5 Fed. 483 (C. C. D. Nev. 1880) ; Evans v. Wrenn, 93 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 346 (1904). Moreover, the rules of the Los Angeles Stock Exchange
provide that any order, unless specifically designated "all or none," must be executed
in board lots-which, in the case of Kinner stock, are multiples of 100 shares. Brief
for Respondent, p. 32, Charles C. Wright v. S.E.C., N. Y. Times, May 21, 1940, p. 35,
col. 7 (C. C. A. 2d).
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Since the matched order provision is limited to situations in which the price,
time and size are "substantially" identical, it seems intended to apply only
where the risk of loss is actually minimized.
If this "riskless" rationale may be attributed to the court, strict construction
of the "substantially the same size" provision does not necessarily render the
section susceptible to easy evasion by the entry of orders differing in size.
It is true that the "100 share lot" theory proposed by the Commission would
have given the term "substantial" a high degree of elasticity. But the court's
interpretation leaves ample leeway for the Commission to determine precisely
what degree of risk must be present in a transaction to place it beyond the
ambit of the matched order ban.
The danger to the manipulator that his activities may force him to take
a position in the market depends upon many factors. Most apparent of those
bearing upon "substantially the same size" are the extent of the disparity
in size and the condition of the market when the orders are entered. If, for
example, the orders are to sell 1,000 shares and buy 100, the potential risk
of assuming a relatively large position is greater than if the orders are to sell
1,000 and buy 900. Again, if orders are entered during a period of active
trading, the chance that concurrent bids or offers by outsiders will force the
broker to take a position is greater than if activity has slackened. In practice,
matched orders are usually resorted to at a time when trading is slight in
order to register activity upon the tape.20
Another important element in evaluating the risk of assuming a position
is the manipulator's current market position. The risk of loss from having
a large sell order absorbed by outsiders in the early stages of a "mark-up"
operation 2' will vary inversely to the strength of the operator's long position.
If his position is fortified by a substantial low-priced option he may be com-
pletely protected from intercepting orders. The manipulator operating on a
slim trading margin without an option, however, is highly vulnerable to the
threat of having his orders intercepted by outsiders. Consequently he runs
a more substantial risk of taking a position in entering countervailing orders
which are not identically matched.
In view of these risk criteria, the holding in the Wright case may well
be limited to the proposition that orders to sell 10,000 shares at 60 and to
buy 2,500 shares "at market" entail sufficient risk of interception -and risk
of loss in Wright's market position -to place them beyond the statutory
prohibition.2 2 The decision need not hamper the future application of this
20. 'Mathias, Manipulative Practices and the Securities Exchange Act (1936) 3 U.
OF Prrr. L. REv. 7, 25.
21. A "mark-up" operation is a series of transactions designed to increase the
market price of a security. This operation, prior to 1934, customarily preceded the
unloading of option stock on the market. See Comment, Market Manipulation and the
Securities Exchange Act (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 624; FOWLER, INTnoDucrTo. To WALL
STREET (1930) 142.
22. The court may perhaps be criticized for not giving sufficient weight to the
option which stood ready to cushion any shock to Vright's position. The market price
had already been raised 15 points above the option price when the alleged matched order
was effected.
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section to transactions involving less risk. The result in the instant case
might well have been otherwise had Wright's buy order been for 6,000 or
8,000 shares. Thus the court's attitude in the Wright case does not neces-
sarily indicate an interpretation so strict as to vitiate this statutory attempt
to ban matched orders, and may be regarded as leaving open a means of
penalizing evasive devices which more closely achieve the prohibited result.
Furthermore, where, as in the Wright case, a series of transactions create
an artificial price for the purpose of inducing others to enter the market -
even though the orders themselves successfully skirt the pitfalls of the matched
order- the more comprehensive prohibition of Section 9(a) (2) stands ready
to afford investors a substantial protection.
Equally significant as its construction of the matched order provision is
the interpretation which the court has placed upon its power to review the
Commission's choice of the expulsion remedy. The court affirmed the Com-
mission's view that an expulsion order is not a penalty, but a remedial device
for investor protection. Consequently a violation resulting in an expulsion
order need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor need it be sup-
ported upon review by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but only by
substantial evidence. The opinion, however, is somewhat hazy regarding
the scope of the court's review of a Commission order of suspension or
expulsion. Apparently, the court separated review of the Commission entry
of any order, expulsion or suspension from review of the Commission's choice
between expulsion and suspension. The court seems to have taken the view
that the SEC's finding that an order is "necessary or appropriate for the
protection of investors"- a sine qua non under Seclion 19(a) (3) -must be
supported by some proof. Such proof, however, may be no more than sub-
stantial evidence of a violation of one of the manipulation provisions of Sec-
tion 9.
Not even this measure of review was retained by the court over the
Commission's choice between suspension and expulsion. The majority of
the court believed that the court had no power to "supervise the Commission's
discretionary determination that expulsion was 'necessary or appropriate for
the protection of investors.' " Judge Swan, who wrote the opinion, disagreed,
taking the reasonable position that the court had the power to pass upon
the severity of an order. He based his argument upon the meaning of the
word "modify" in the section of the act that provides that a reviewing court
may, in its discretion, "affirm, modify and enforce, or set aside" the order.2
In the belief, however, that expulsion was too severe a remedy in this case,
the court remanded the cause in order that the Commission might determine,
in its discretion, whether or not to reduce the order to one of suspension.2 4
The court's reaction to the penalty was based in part upon its assumption
that expulsion was a permanent step which could not be retraced. There is,
however, no statutory reason why the Commission might not at a later date,
23. § 25, 48 STAT. 901, 15 U. S. C. § 78y (1934).
24. The court was impressed by the fact that this was Wright's first infraction of
the Act, and that there was no indication that he was a habitual manipulator or would
be likely to attempt further manipulation of the market. The remand was justified by the
court's reversal of the Commission's interpretation of § 9(a) (1).
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if so disposed, reinstate Wright upon direct application, or indirectly should
Wright seek to register as an over-the-counter dealer with a national securities
association under Section 15A.2 5 An opposite conclusion would force the
Commission to make one final and extreme choice between suspension for
not more than one year and permanent expulsion.
The relinquishment by the court of a supervisory check upon the severity
of an order is particularly significant in view of the almost complete dis-
cretion vested in the Commission to decree suspension or expulsion. The
Commission is faced with the nice problem of determining the degree of
culpability which warrants expulsion instead of suspension. No criterion is
provided by the statute other than that the Commission must believe "such
action necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors." Other pro-
ceedings by the Commission under Section 19(a) (3), the expulsion section.
shed little light upon the Commission's standards of determination.20
The problem of determining the degree of penalty, if any, which is war-
ranted by the evidence goes to the essence of judicial judgments. Yet the
surrender of this broad range of judicial discretion to an administrative agency
as competent as the Securities and Exchange Commission may well be justi-
fied by the extreme complexity of the subject matter involved and the Com-
mission's superior vantage ground from which to weigh the evidence.' This
power of the Commission, although more spectacular, is closely analogous
to the power to revoke licenses frequently entrusted to administrative bodies.P
Insurance against abuse of this power depends upon appellate review of the
25. § 15A (b) (4) prohibits an association of over-the-counter dealers from admitting
to membership a broker or dealer who has been suspended or expelled from a national
securities exchange. The Commission, however, may authorize admission if "appropriate
in the public interest." 52 STAT. 1070, 15 U. S. C. 78o-3(b) (4) (Supp. 1933).
26. In six years, only eight proceedings other than the lright case have been
instituted under § 19(a) (3). In four of these no order was entered. Thomas F. Gagen
(suspension for one year by consent) ; Harry A. Dart (expelled by the stock exchange) ;
Abbott, Proctor, and Paine (voluntary resignation from membership); E. F. Hutton
(proceeding dropped); see THmD ANNUAL REPORT, SEC (1937) 71. Of the remaining
four, only one resulted in expulsion. Michael J. Meehan, 2 S.E.C. 583 (1938). The
other three were: Harold T. White et al., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1745, June
22, 1938 (90 day suspension); W. E. Hutton & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No.
2033, Mar. 4, 1939 (30 and 90 day suspensions by consent) ; Junius A. Richards, SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 2054, Mar. 27, 1939 (10 day suspension). None of these
cases was appealed. For discussions of some of these cases, see Redmond, An Exteriment
in Administrative Law (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 622; Note (1939) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ra-
638.
27. See Landis, Significance of Administratize Commissions (1937) 12 I-.D. L. J.
471, 475; LANDIs, THE AimrxisTRA=E PRocEss (1933) 84 et seq.
28. There are many instances where Congress has conferred upon administrative
agencies the power to revoke licenses. See e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 STAT.
159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 181 (1934) ; Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 993 (1922), 7 U. S. C.
§ 1 (1934); Cotton Standards Act, 42 STAT. 1517 (1923), 7 U. S. C. § 51 (1934).
The constitutionality of such delegations has been consistently upheld. Moore v. Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, 90 F. (2d) 735 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 710
(1938) ; Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); Farmer's Livestock
Comm. v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 375 (E. D. Ill. 1931).
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"substantial evidence" underlying findings of fact, and upon the willingness
of the Commission to comply with recommendations of leniency made by the
court.
The power to expel is an extremely sharp weapon,2) to be used sparingly
lest it produce unnecessary hardship. That the Commission is cognizant of
this danger is evident from the fact that there have been only two expulsions
in its six year history. Perhaps the greatest value of this sanction lies not
in its actual exercise, but rather in its deterrent effect.30 Stockbrokers as
a class are particularly sensitive to such a threat, since the mere institution
of an expulsion proceeding carries with it a stigma severely detrimental to
their business. There is substantial indication that the Commission's future
policy will be one of winning compliance by the threat of positive sanctions,
rather than of penalizing or eliminating those who violate the Act."'
FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS IN APPEALS FROM
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS*
THE joinder provisions1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
permit litigants to assert in a single suit any claims legal or equitable
which may be outstanding between them, have necessitated a revision of the
tests for determining the finality, for the purpose of appeal, of a district court
29. An interesting problem which may well face the SEC at some future date is
the effect that can be given to an expulsion order. The Act does not empower the SEC
to sell the offending member's seat and the SEC presumably will permit the sale to be
executed in the same manner as if the stock exchange itself decreed the expulsion. The
rules of the New York Stock Exchange provide that a member expelled for reasons other
than insolvency may sell his seat privately. If the member refused to sell he might
not be forced to do so by the New York Stock Exchange. The Exchange might take
the view that expulsion by the SEC is not tantamount to expulsion by the Exchange
itself, because the definition of the word "member" under the Exchange Act is broader
than its meaning in the Exchange constitution. Furthermore, the constitutions of the
New York Stock Exchange and of most other exchanges make no provision for expulsion
other than by order of the Board of Governors upon finding a member guilty of willfully
violating the Act. But if the Exchange cooperated as it probably would, expulsion by
order of the Board of Governors might well be predicated upon a violation of Exchange
rule against fictitious transactions [Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange,
Art. xvi, §3.], or upon the non-compliance with the SEC order itself. If, however, the
Board was recalcitrant, the Commission might bring a mandamus proceeding in a
district court to force the member to sell the seat himself. §21(f), 48 STAT. 901, 15
U. S. C. § 78u(f). Or perhaps pressure might be applied to the Exchange itself under
the threat of revoking its registration. § 19(a) (1). Such a step, however, is obviously
so drastic that the Commission would be unlikely to resort to it.
30. It should be noted that the manipulation on a single exchange- the Los Angeles
Stock Exchange -warranted expulsion from all five exchanges of which Wright was
a member.
31. FiFTH ANNUAL REPORT, SEC (1939) 94.
* Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
1. FED. RuLxs CIv. PROC. 13 (b), (c); 14 (a); 18 (a), (b).
-order. In an attempt to make this necessary adjustment, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has recently indicated a basis upon which the traditional
conception of the final determination of a suit 2 may be reconciled with the
practical problems arising from this change in trial court procedure. 3
The court's previous test of finality with regard to suits involving the
joinder of claims is found in the case of Sheppy v. Steens.4 The general
rule was there established that all the claims in litigation in a suit are to
,be considered as a single judicial unit which must be settled completely
before any appeal may be taken.5 In conjunction with the procedures effective
in the district courts of the Second Circuit under the Conformity Act," such
a rule was clearly feasible and, indeed, probably the most satisfactory of
possible rules. Since the state procedural systems of that circuit permitted
the joinder only of causes of action closely related in form or content 7 what
were in appearance different claims were usually alternate ways of pleading
on the basis of a single group of facts, or claims so closely related that an
appellate court would for greatest convenience wish to consider them simul-
taneously. The rule was clear and certain of application, and not unduly
harsh for litigants. Appeals were postponed only until all the claims arising
from a single transaction or a closely related group of claims were disposed
of by the trial court.
With the promulgation of the Federal Rules, however, the rule of Sheppy
v. Stevens has become an anomalous doctrine. Conceived to fit a procedure
in which every suit was the trial of a single cause or a small group of well-
integrated causes, that rule is ill adapted to a procedural system under which
2. For the traditional view see Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 370 (1920) ; Arnold
v. Guimarin & Co., 263 U. S. 427, 434 (1923) ; DOME, FEDRaFL JursDcTIoN A;D Plo-
cEnuan (1928) 792; RosE, FEDERAL JURISIcrTION AND PnccEDURm (4th ed. 1931) 575.
For criticism of the final order rule see Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 539.
3. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
In addition to the opinion of the court by Judge A. Hand, there is a concurring opinion
by Judge Clark dealing solely with the final order problem, id. at 86.
4. 200 Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912). Although Sheppy v. Stevens was not cited
therein, the same rule wi-as applied in Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Arnson, 239 Fed.
891 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), also over-ruled by the Collins case.
5. The general language used in the decision makes no distinction between a suit
which involves a single cause of action and one in which independent causes have been
joined.
6. REv. STAT. § 914 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 724 (1934). The states to whose practice
that of the district courts of the Second Circuit conformed under this act were Xev:
York, Connecticut and Vermont.
7. In New York, until 1935, causes could be joined if they all fell within one of
eleven different categories of claims, or if they arose out of the same transaction. N. Y.
CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1914) § 484. Since 1935, unlimited joinder much like that in the
Federal courts has been permitted. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr (1939) § 258. But see Legis.
(1937) 37 CoL- L. REv. 462, 471 n. 51. Connecticut joinder practice closely resemb!es
that of New York before 1935. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5512. The Vermont practice
preserves the distinction between legal and equitable actions, and does not permit claims
to be joined even though they arise out of the same transaction. VT. Pen. Lws (1933)
§ 1572, Van Cleve v. Eastern Fruit Co., 91 Vt. 410, 100 Ati. 922 (1917).
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a suit may be a heterogeneous collection of claims, some of which are alterna-
tive, some closely connected and some quite unrelated. Under the present
federal district court practice, a plaintiff may join in his complaint any claims
legal or equitable which he may have against the defendant," provided only
that the claims are within the jurisdiction of the court.0 Counterclaims may
be freely asserted by the defendant, even though he seeks therein relief
different in kind from that sought in the complaint and arising out of totally
different transactions. 10 This freedom of joinder is accompanied by a tech-
nical equipment adequate to handle the resulting agglomeration of claims
in a single action. Thus separate trials of any claim or issue or of any group
of claims and issues may be ordered by the court. 1 Even if separate trials
have not been ordered, under Rule 54(b) separate judgments may be entered
at various stages of the action as different claims are tried to conclusion.
These provisions are designed to permit the district court judge freely to
separate and group a confused mass of claims into appropriate units for
judicial determination. In most circuit courts, under precedents like Shcppy
V. Stevens, this convenient separation of distinct claims would be destroyed
at the appeal stage,12 and appellate determination of causes joined tinder the
new Rules would be hopelessly delayed. These courts, moreover, would find
no real benefit in such omnibus appeals, because they would be forced to
separate the claims again in order to deal with them properly.
It was therefore natural that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,'3 should abandon the rule of
Sheppy v. Stevens. In the district court proceedings 14 in the Collins case,
one of two claims asserted by the plaintiff had been dismissed because it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On appeal from
this dismissal, the circuit court, assimilating the order to a judgment under
Rule 54(b),' 5 held it final for purpose of appeal, and thus eliminated the
8. F.ED. RULES CIV. PROC. 18 (a), (b).
9. For discussion of the jurisdictional limitations on joinder see 1 MoouE's FE.DMIAL
PRACTICE (1938) 695; 2 id. at 2121; Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdielional Lia-"
itations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 393.
10. FED. RULES CIV. PROC. 13 (b), (c) (as to an original defendant); 14 (a) (as
to a third party defendant).
11. FED. RULES CIv. PR0c. 42 (b).
12. Precedents similar to Sheppy v. Stevens may be found in decisions by the First
Circuit Court, Groblewski v. John Chmiell Co., 264 Fed. 325 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919); by
the Fifth, Wuerpel v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 231 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 5th,
1916); by the Sixth, Kelsey Wheel Co. v. Universal Rim Co., 296 Fed. 616 (C. C. A.
6th, 1924); and by the Eighth, United States v. Bighorn Sheep Co., 276 Fed. 710 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1921). Contra: Historical Pub. Co. v. Jones Bros. Pub. Co., 231 Fed. 784
(C. C. A. 3d, 1916) ; Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366 (C. C. A. 4th, 1904). Cf. Klever
v. Seawall, 65 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894); Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Cleveland
Steel Barrel Co., 268 Fed. 536 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920).
13. 106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
14. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
15. The Rules went into effect Sept. 16, 1938. See FED. RULES CIv. PRoc. 86. How-
ever, they were not applied to proceedings in copyright actions until Sept. 1, 1939. Order
of United States Supreme Court, June 5, 1939, 59 Sup. Ct. clxxv. They did not, there-
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difficulties attendant upon the continued application of the Sheppy v. Slc-,ens
doctrine. But the decision of the court to permit an appeal from judgment on
less than all claims presented in the suit necessitates some delineation of the
scope of a "claim" for purposes of appeal. If the benefits of segmentary
judgments under Rule 54(b) are to be preserved, the definition of a claim
must harmonize with the concept of a final order, to which the appellate juris-
diction of circuit courts of appeals is, in general, limited by statute.10
The solution indicated in the Collins case rests on the pragmatic theory
of a cause of action as the total of all claims arising out of a single set of
facts or a single transaction. 17 Although the Rules of Civil Procedure dispense
with the phrase "cause of action,"18 definition of which has created so much
disagreement,19 the pragmatic or transaction theory is implicit throughout.20
Rule 54(b) can be understood or properly applied only when read in this
light. A judgment may be entered, the Rule reads, "upon a determination
of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out
of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim."
The rule thus clearly bases the entry of a judgment on the determination of
a complete claim, not of individual issues.21 Counterclaims relating to the
fore, directly govern the Collins case (decided Aug. 7, 1939), but the decision was based
on the policy of the Rules in anticipation of their subsequent applicability to such suits.
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). There
was considerable confusion with regard to the application of the Rules to copyright suits
until the order of June 5, 1939. Compare White v. Reach, 26 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 26 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. N. Y.
1938).
16. 26 STAT. 828 (1891), as amended; 28 U. S. C. §225 (Supp. 1939). The Federal
Rules, which by the terms of the Enabling Act under which they were promulgated apply
only to district court practice, can naturally have no effect upon the appellate juris-
diction of a circuit court of appeals. 4S STAT. 1064 (1934), 23 U. S. C. § 723b (1934).
See 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTI cE (1938) 3155. Hon. W. D. Mitchell, the chairman of
the Advisory Committee, while admitting that Rule 54 (b) might in a sense "change the
right of appeal or the necessity for it," has stated that this is "not really so." PnPcaro-
INGs oF A. B. A. INsTITuTE, WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK (1938) 329.
17. See CLARx, CODE PLEADING (1928) 75,87; Clark, The Code Cause of Action
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817; Clark, The Cause of Action (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. Rmw.
354. This interpretation of Rule 54 (b), not enpressed clearly in the majority opinion,
was emphasized particularly in Judge Clark's concurring opinion. It has been clarified
and elaborated in his subsequent opinions in Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. (2d) 405
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) and Atwater v. North American Coal Corp., 111 F. (2d) 125, 126
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (concurring opinion).
18. See 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 145.
19. See McCaskill, Actions and Causes of .lction (1925) 34 YAIE L. J. 614; Gavit,
A "Pragmatic Definition" of the "Cause of Action"? (1933) 82 U. oF PA. L RE. 129;
Gavit, The Cause of Action-A Reply (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 695.
20. See FED. RULES Civ. Proc. 10 (b); 13 (a), (g); 15 (c); 54 (b), in all of v;hich
a single transaction or occurrence is a determining element for various purposes.
21. The Advisory Committee has cited statutes of Wisconsin and New Yor: as
comparable to 54 (b). NOTES TO FED. RULES Civ. Proc. 50. Experience under these stat-
utes, however, is of no value for federal purposes. The Wisconsin statute provides for a
judgment against one of several defendants or for a judgment substantially settling a
claim with an accounting or special issue outstanding. Such judgments, even if clearly
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same transaction or occurrence must also be finally adjudicated in order that
all the problems arising from the set of facts in question will be settled before
an appeal is taken.22 Alternative claims or overlapping claims are to be
considered as only one claim for purpose of judgment under 54(b), 23 because
they deal with a single fact situation.24
By limiting judgments under Rule 54(b) to final determinations of all
the issues relevant to a single transaction, the traditional conception of a
final order is preserved, in the sense that the judicial unit presented on appeal
will be no smaller than it was formerly. 25 Satisfactory as this adjustment
interlocutory, may and indeed must be appealed individually, and hence the final order
problem does not arise. WIs. STAT. (1939) § 270.54, Richter v. Standard Mfg. Co.,
224 Wis. 121, 271 N. W. 14 (1937). The New York statute permits a final appealable
judgment as to "a part of a cause of action" and hence the only consideration in apply-
ing it is one of trial convenience. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT (1939) § 476; Lowe v. Lowe,
:265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 29.1 (1934).
22. See 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3157.
23. Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 54b.31-1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
24. If the district court judge issues an order disposing of an issue less than a claim,
this must be construed as an interlocutory order analogous to the partial summary judg-
ment provided for in Rule 56 (d), which is clearly not appealable. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACrICE (1938) 3191. Such interlocutory orders are clearly contemplated by Rule
42 (b), which permits separate trials of any claim or issue. To forestall completely any
temptation to appeal such a judicial disposition, the judge might state clearly his find-
ings of fact and his conclusions of law and state that the court would direct the entry of
the appropriate judgment when the remaining issues were settled. This is the exact
opposite of the practice of entering the order and withholding the findings which is sug-
gested in Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affected by the New Rules of
Civil Procedure (1939) 24 MINN. L. REv. 1, 37. Such a practice would be unfair to
litigants because it keeps them unnecessarily in the dark as to the basis of the court's
decision. The propriety of district court control over appellate jurisdiction by either
method, however, is questionable.
25, Although there have been definite statements by the Supreme Court that an
appealable order must be final "as to all the causes of action involved," the cases in which
this sweeping rule is expressed involve one set of operative facts and hence, under the
transaction theory, one cause of action. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 370 (1920)
(single factual basis of the petition was illegal detention). See also John Simmons Co. v.
Grier Bros. Co., 258 U. S. 82 (1922) (claims for patent infringement and unfair compe-
tition arising out of a single product) ; Ex parte National Enameling Co., 201 U. S. 156
(1906) (one product claimed to infringe a single patent). In cases involving several
distinct claims, the Court has adopted a different policy. United States v. River Rouge
Imprvt. Co., 269 U. S. 411 (1926) (order finally disposing of all issues between certain
parties, although litigation continued in respect to different causes between other parties,
held final); Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 563 (1883) (order disposing of claims of a
party intervening in foreclosure proceedings, final); Ex parle Tiffany, 252 U. S. 32
(1920) (order disposing of special application in receivership proceedings, final) ; Trus-
tees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1882) (order settling claims minor and incidental to
the main controversy, final). Cases like Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., in
which more than one claim is being litigated between two parties and a judgment is
entered on only one of these claims, have been presented to the Supreme Court infre-
quently, but such orders have been held final. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. v. Southern
Expr. Co., 108 U. S. 24 (1883) ; Hill v. Chicago & Ev. R. R., 140 U. S. 52 (1891).
[Vol. 491480
NOTES
of the traditional final order rule to the new district court procedure may
seem in theory, however, it must still be determined whether the necessary
measure of certainty for district judges and litigants has been preserved. The
confusion evident in recent cases in the Second Circuit might well lead to
a conclusion that the new test is too indefinite and too uncertain to be applied
accurately and confidently by those concerned with the trial below.'O A
judge may be influenced by the decision in the Collins case to interpret Rule
54(b) as permitting entry of judgments freely throughout the course of
the trial, although only one cause of action is in litigation;27 a litigant may
feel that in order to protect himself, he must appeal immediately from orders
which would formerly have been considered clearly interlocutory.P Much of
this misunderstanding might arise from the failure of the majority opinion to
specify clearly the test by which a cause of action is to be delimited, and
from certain language therein which could be construed to mean that, at
the discretion of the district court judge, any issue may be finally adjudicated
and appealed.2 9 Subsequent decisions have clarified the rule of the Collins
case, however, and should eliminate confusion from these sources.30
The more serious problem arising from the Collins decision, if the case
be accepted at its face value, concerns not the general interpretation of Rule
54(b) in terms of the transaction theory of a cause of action, but rather the
application of the theory to the particular facts of that case. The two claims
held therein to constitute separate causes of action were for copyright in-
fringement and unfair competition, claims which in many cases are held to
be merely alternative or, as expressed in Hum v. Ourslkr, "different epithets
to characterize the same group of circumstances." 3 1 In distinguishing the
latter case, the court argued that the Collins copyright claim, which concerned
the infringement of the contents of a book by a motion picture, and the
unfair competition claim, which concerned the alleged misuse of the title
of the book, rested on distinct factual bases and were supported by different
evidence. 32 Although it is true that the transactions were not identical, such
an interpretation of the cause of action seems to differ from that indicated
26. See Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, infra note 27; Atwater v. North American Ceal
Corp., infra note 28.
27. In a case involving two similar claims and only one real cause of action, three
separate judgments were entered. Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940).
28. In the case of Atwater v. North American Coal Corporation, 111 F. (2d) 125
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940), an appeal was taken from an order dismissing counts vith leave
to amend and from an order dismissing counts as to less than all the defendants, although
such orders have repeatedly been held not final. Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423
(1910); Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U. S. 26'2 (1893); Shultz v.
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 103 F. (2d) 771 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
29. "It may be said that the sanction of an appeal in a case like the present will add
to the complexity of litigation and unnecessarily multiply reviews. This, however, will
as a practical matter remain within the control of the district judge." Collins v. Metro-
Goldyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
30. See cases cited supra note 17.
31. 289 U. S. 238, 246 (1933).
32. 106 F. (2d) 83, 85, 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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in many Supreme Court cases which define the scope of particular causes
of action.3 3 Since the concept, however, was being used in these cases in
a context other than the determination of the finality of a judgment, the court
in the Collins case felt free to employ a different concept for final order
purposes.3 4 By thus making decisions defining a cause of action of little
value for final order purposes unless they deal directly with that problem,
the case has produced an uncertainty for litigants which seemingly can be
dissipated only by the slow accumulation of a sizable body of final order
precedents. This uncertainty is accentuated by the fact that the concept
of a cause of action here used for final order purposes- partly resting, as
it does, upon the independence of the nature of proof involved - is narrower
than that more generally utilized by the Supreme Court. Although this
interpretation makes possible a degree of appellate court discretion in the
interests of its own convenience,35 litigants might feel more secure in con-
serving appeals until complete determination of a case had the Collins concept
of a cause of action conformed more closely to the broader Supreme Court
theory.
In view of the uncertainties thus created, it is possible that the Collins
case is being accorded a significance different from that intended by the court.
It is at least arguable that the court contemplated that the narrow view of
the cause of action there enunciated would be utilized only when a litigant
seeks to appeal before complete determination of all claims embraced in a
case. If the appeal in the Collins case had been taken after complete disposi-
tion of the case by the district court, it does not necessarily follow that the
33. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933) (scope of cause of action to deter-
mine federal jurisdiction) ; United States v. California and Oregon Land Co., 192 U. S.
355 (1904) (land patents attacked at different times on completely different grounds;
held one cause of action for purpose of res judicata) ; Moore v. New York Cotton Ex-
change, 270 U. S. 593, 609 (1926) (claim and counterclaim, although resting on different
operative facts, held to arise from one transaction for purpose of federal jurisdiction);
Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U. S. 197 (1938) (amendment broadening source
of injuries sustained by employee, held to relate back to defeat statute of limitations be-
cause all pleadings concerned a single group of injuries). See also Judge Clark's dis-
sent taking a broad view of a cause of action for purposes of federal jurisdiction in Lewis
v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 16, 18 (1939); Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U. S,
207 (1918) (statute of limitations) ; Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316
(1927) (res judicata); Southern Pac. Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A.
9th, 1934) (res judicata).
34. 106 F. (2d) 83, 85, 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). See Justice Cardozo's dictum that
"A 'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for
another." United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67 (1933).
35. There is much to be said for the position that appealability should not rest com-
pletely upon the abstraction of a cause of action but, within the limits of practical final-
ity, should also be determined by considerations of appellate convenience. Cf. Cobble-
dick v. United States, 60 Sup. Ct. 540 (U. S. 1940). By narrowing the concept of a cause
and thus creating some flexibility, the appellate court may entertain appeals which,
although not completely distinct under the transaction theory, may justify appealability
because separate consideration does not duplicate appellate court effort. Such an appeal
would be one which involved only legal issues not raised by related claims.
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circuit court would have held that the appellant had lost his opportunity
to appeal from the first judgment because the appeal time had run. 0  WVere
the court clearly to indicate that the Collins rule is to be applied only where
the appeal is taken early and not where it is delayed, litigants doubtful of
the proper application of the cause of action test would not feel it necessary
to protect themselves by appealing from every order which might possibly
be construed as an appealable judgment.
Although this interpretation of the Collins case contemplates an optional
appeal hitherto unrecognized expressly by the judiciary, its justification rests
on the assurance which it affords litigants otherwise confused as to the
timeliness of their appeals. The adoption of this view of the Collins case
may well involve a radical reorientation of the traditional conception of a
final order; nevertheless, it is perhaps the only completely satisfactory solution
to appellate uncertainties created by the liberalizing of district court joinder
practice.
COMPENSATION TO TRUSTEE FOR USE OF RAILROAD
EQUIPMENT UNDER DISAFFIRMED LEASE*
IN the intricate hierarchy of railroad capital structures the equipment trust
obligation occupies a unique position. Secured by the least permanent part
of the railroad plant, it is nonetheless regarded as safer than a first mort-
gage bond.' Even when railroad securities are "put through the wringer,"
the equipment trust is generally untouched.2 When, however, a railroad, in-
solvent and in reorganization, possesses equipment no longer necessary for
its operation, the position of the equipment trust is severely tested. Such a
situation has arisen in the case of the Florida East Coast Railway Co. Series
D Equipment Trust. Proceedings by the trustee in the equity reorganiza-
tion court are significant in evaluating various remedies of the certificate
holders after disaffirmance of the lease.3
The railroad had expanded rapidly during the Florida boom of the '20s,
and in the process had acquired much equipment under standard "Philadel-
phia Plan" equipment trust leases.4 The receivers who came into control in
36. Although an appellate court, in such a close case, might not dismiss the suit
sua sponte, a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that it is too late would prob.-
ably be raised by the appellee. If the concept of a cause of action has any flexibility at all,
it would be applied differently to an inclusive appeal than to a segmentary appeal in
such a case.
* New York Trust Co. v. Kenan, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Fla., Feb. 2, 1940.
1. See DUNCAN, EuIPmENT OBLIGATIONS (1924) 10.
2. See, e.g., the recent drastic reorganization proposed by the ICC for the New
Haven. 6 PooR's FINAN. REcoRDs, AILRomADS 4205 (April 23, 1940).
3. New York Trust Co. v. Kenan, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Fla., Feb. 2, 1940.
4. So called because it originated in Pennsylvania, a contract by the Schuylkill
Navigation Co. in 1845 being considered the first example. The characteristic feature
of the Philadelphia Plan is use of a lease rather than a conditional sale or chattel mort-
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1931,' after the collapse of the boom, found themselves with a surplus of
rolling stock, much of it in bad repair. The Series D equipment, consisting
principally of 20 locomotives and 300 freight cars, appears to have been in
paricularly bad shape. In May, 1932, a mortgage trustee intervened, as is
customary, in the creditors' receivership action, and was granted foreclosure
and appointment of the same receivers to operate the road in the interests of
bon('holders and other creditors.0 The receivers made some payments on
account toward the equipment obligations and were granted extensions on the
rest. In 1934, however, they procured authorization to disaffirm the Series D
lease, 7 and permitted a default to occur. A committee representing equipment
trust certificate holders, anxious to avoid disaffirmance, thereupon entered
into protracted negotiations with the receivers which came to an end in 1936
when the option to disaffirm was exercised.8 Although the equipment trustee
could have obtained leave simply to enter and retake the equipment, it deter-
mined to secure a more formal judicial sanction. Accordingly, in April, 1936,
a decree was obtained reciting the default, upholding the validity of the lease,
determining the sum due, and allowing the trustee a judicial sale. The pur-
pose of this virtually unprecedented sale was to protect the receivers in de-
livering possession, to insure marketable title in the trustee, and to fix with
finality the amount of the railroad's obligation. After the sale, at whkh the
trustee purchased most of the equipment for the benefit of the certificate
holders, the trustee obtained a deficiency decree for the remainder of the pur-
chase price." When it subsequently became apparent that the deficiency judg-
ment could not be collected out of the railroad's assets, the successor trustee
ins.iLuted an action in 1939 against the receivers 0 to obtain compensation
for their use and possession from 1931 to 1936.
In the latter action the receivers, analogizing the lease enforcement decree
to a mortgage foreclosure and suit for the purchase price and relying upon
the Florida rule that a vendor in a conditional sale who sues for the pur-
chase price is held to have elected to regard title as having passed to the
vendee, and may not, thereafter, sue to obtain possession," advanced the
gage. DUNcAN,, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18. The use of this complex form of financing
is generally attributed to a desire to obtain priority over after-acquired property c'auses
in railroad mortgages. DUNCAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14. But it seems that the same
result might be attained by other methods. See Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1878)
(conditional sale) ; Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 90 Fed. 322 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898)
(purchase money mortgage). Its persistence is probably due to tradition and to the sim-
plicity of recordation and unquestioned validity given by statute in all states, These are
collected by DUNCAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 324.
5. Standard Oil Co. v. Florida East Coast Ry., U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Fla., 1931
(unreported case).
6. Florida East Coast Equity Proceeding, Doc. 84, Court Record Vol. 1, p. 421.
7. Florida East Coast Equity Proceeding, Doc. 312, Court Record Vol. III, p. 325,
8. Florida East Coast Equity Proceeding, Doc. 517, Court Record Vol. IV, p, 555.
9. Florida East Coast Equity Proceeding, Doc. 666, Court Record Vol. V, p. 478.
10. Florida East Coast Equity Proceeding, Doc. 767, Court Record Vol. VI, p. 155.
11. Central Farmer's Trust Co. v. McCampbell Furniture Stores, 128 Fla. 60, 174
So. 748 (1937) ; Robertson v. Northern Motor Securities Co., 105 Fla. 644, 142 So. 226
(1932) ; Vosges Motor Co. v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785 (1929) ; American Process
Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942 (1908).
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earlier decree as a bar to the present action upon the grounds of election of
remedies, merger and res judicata.'2 The court, overruling this defense and
sustaining the trustee's right to bring the action,'5 relied principally upon a
provision of the lease agreement giving the trustee cumulative remedies.14 It
held, also, that the 1936 decree should not be held to operate retroactively 15
so as to deprive the trustee of title between 1931 and 1936, the period for
which compensation was sought. Such operation would have the anomalous
effect of transferring title to the railway as of the beginning of the receiver-
ship or the making of the lease, contrary to the unquestionable understanding
of the parties at those times.
The decision seems clearly correct, not only upon the grounds given, but
also because the prior action was not a mortgage foreclosure or a conventional
suit for the purchase price, but, as the wording of the decree makes clear, a
special equitable suit for the enforcement of the lease agreement according
to its terms. Application of the Florida conditional sale doctrine to equip-
ment trust leases, in the face of a Florida statute'0 specifically making lawful
the retention of title in the trustee under such agreements until the purchase
price is fully paid, seems an undesirable extension of a doctrine nut too well
founded at best. 7 Furthermore, there is good authority for giling the trustee
the right to maintain an action for compensation even if title is assumed to
be in the railroad subject to a vendor's lien in the trustee.' 8
That the owner of leased property has a right to compensation for use and
possession by the receiver of the lessee is well settled, both in railroad equip-
ment trust and other cases.' 9 The nature of the right, important to know in
12. Answer of Receivers, pp. 13, 14.
13. The court referred to a master determination of the damages due the trustee
and the method to be used in ascertaining them.
14. Lease Agreement (July 1924) between Banker's Trust Co., as trustee, and Flor-
ida East Coast Ry., pp. 11, 12. The provision uses broad language, specifying that every
power or remedy given shall be "in addition to" every other puwer or remedy given or
existing at law or equity, and that the exercise of one shall not be a waiver of the right
to exercise any other.
15. No direct precedents for this have been found. The Florida cases, however, in
their choice of words tend to identify passage of title with the day of the decree. See
Central Farmer's Trust Co. v. McCampbell Furniture Stores, 226 Fla. W.0 02, 174 So.
748 (1937) ("that the title passed . . . by operation of law on July 24, 192").
16. FLA. Co. P. Ga.x',. LAws Axx,. (Skillman, 1927) § 6597.
17. The doctrine has been sharply criticized and seems to be a minority rule. Win.
NV. Bierce, Ltd. v. Hutchins, 205 U. S. 341 (1907); Ratchford v. Cayuga County Cold
Storage & IV. Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447 {1916); Weldenbach-Dubelin Co. v.
Anderson, 168 Wis. 212, 169 N. W. 615 (1918). It is felt that such a rule denies to the
vendor the benefit of his retention of title and that the inconsistency is only apparent,
not real. The cases are collected in Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 503, where it is pointed
out that courts which hold the remedies inconsistent have assumed the inconsistency with-
out demonstrating it. Satisfaction from either remedy always bars the uther. Continu-
ous Zinc Furnace Co. v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 0l F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932).
18. Kneeland v. American Loan Co., 136 U. S. S9 (1890).
19. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893) ; Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wil-
son, 142 U. S. 313 (1892) ; Kneeland v. American Loan Co., 1311 U. S. 8s (1890); Myer
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fixing the amount of compensation and the priority of the trustee as against
other creditors, is somewhat uncertain, but more recent cases appear to regard
it as an equitable obligation of a unique sort. 0° The receiver is not an assignee
of the term, and is not liable upon the covenants of the lease unless he can be
held to have adopted it.2' He is entitled to a reasonable period within which
to decide whether to adopt or disaffirm, and courts are reluctant to hold that
he has adopted in the absence of a clear showing. This being true, the courts
base his liability for use upon the fact that as custodian for the court he has
taken possession, and made use, of property belonging to others; therefore,
since a court of equity will not do inequity, the owner is entitled to compen-
sation.22
This concept of the lessor's right as an equity among other equities in the
receivership court, rather than as a clear cut legal right, creates a number
of problems both as to the receiver's liability and as to determination of the
lessor's compensation. If the receiver actually makes use of the property or
attempts to prevent the lessor from retaking, there is little doubt as to his
liability. If, however, he merely holds the property without either con-
structive or actual use thereof, some courts in non-railroad cases have trouble
in finding him answerable.2 3 The usual test in non-railroad cases is posses-
sion, or, occasionally, benefit to the receivership estate. 24 In railroad equip-
ment trust cases, however, receivers have been held liable for all equipment
retained independently of the use made of it.2 5 The most persuasive rationale
v. Car Co., 102 U. S. 1 (1880); Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 84 Fed. 535 (C. C. A.
3d, 1898) ; Central Trust Co. v. Marietta & N. G. Ry., 48 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 5th, 1891) ;
Coe v. New Jersey Midland Ry., 27 N. J. Eq. 37 (1876); Hubbell v. Texas So. Ry.,
59 Tex. Civ. App. 157 (1910), writ of error refused, 104 Tex. 712 (1911) ; In re United
Cigar Stores Corp., 69 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (store property) ; Oscar Hcinte-
man Corp. v. Nat Levy Co., 6 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (store property) ; Day-
ton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsanthal, 116 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902) (real estate) ; Stokes
v. Hoffman House, 167 N. Y. 554, 60 N. E. 667 (1901) (real estate); Prenatt v. Mes-
senger Printing Co., 250 Pa. 406, 95 Atl. 564 (1915) (machinery).
20. Oscar Heineman Corp v. Nat Levy & Co., 6 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
Stokes v. Hoffman House, 167 N. Y. 554, 60 N. E. 667 (1901).
21. Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313 (1892); In re United Cigar Stores
Corp., 69 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Stoepel v. Union Trust Co., 121 Mich. 281, 80
N. W. 13 (1899); Stokes v. Hoffman House, 167 N. Y. 554, 60 N. E. 667 (1901).
22. Oscar Heineman Corp. v. Nat Levy & Co., 6 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
Frank v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 23 Fed. 123 (C. C. Colo. 1885).
23. Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F. (2d) 346 (N. D. Ohio 1922). But cf. Dayton
Hydraulic Co. v. Felsanthal, 116 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902).
24. Matthews v. Butte Machinery Co., 286 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) (posses-
sion); Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsanthal, 116 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902) (posses-
sion); Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F. (2d) 346 (N. D. Ohio 1922) (benefit) ; accord
Prenatt v. Messenger Printing Co., 250 Pa. 406, 95 Atl. 564 (1915). The only clear-cut
rule exempting the receiver from liability where he retains the property is where it i.
subleased; in that case he does nothing but furnish essential services, heat, etc., and col-
lect rents, making them available for the landlord. Irving Trust Co. v. Densmore, 66
F. (2d) 21 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) ; Mehan v. King, 54 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932)
(bankruptcy).
25. There is no mention in the reported cases of an examination into the use. In
Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893), the receiver made an informal agree-
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is that the bondholders requested the court to take possession of all the
equipment, that it was their duty, and not that of the court upon its own
motion, to return such of it as they could not use, and that failing to do so
they must pay compensation for retention of all.2 0 In the instant case, some
doubt may be created by the fact that the equipment trust certificate holders'
committee was anxious to avoid disaffirmance and, in fact, urged the receiv-
ers to retain the equipment.27 The sole power of effective disposition of the
equipment remained, however, with the receivers and they used some of the
equipment; furthermore mere possession of the remainder was probably use-
ful, since the equipment was available for "stand by" service.2 8
In fixing compensation the courts initially were inclined to award the con-
tract rate for the period between the establishment of the receivership and
the return of the equipment. 29 Although such an award has the merit uf sim-
plicity, there is no necessary reason why the stipulated contract rental should
correspond to an equitable and just compensation for use, particularly since
the contract rate in equipment trusts includes both pure compensation for
user and amortization of the purchase price.30 Thus courts at present usually
award reasonable rental, the contract rate being prima facie reasonable unless
the contrary is shown.3 ' If the reasonableness of the contract rate is effective-
ly rebutted, the court must independently determine a reasonable rate. The
first question is whether the rate shall be based on value to the lessee, fixed
either on a mileage basis or on the basis of earnings during the period, or on
value to the lessor as fixed by some percentage return on the depreciated
investment value of the property (referred to hereafter as the investment plus
maintenance formula). 32 Compensation may also be determined by use of
the car rental formulas applied between independent railroads where equip-
ment moves off the owning line.
In deciding which procedure to follow, the lack of precedent in equipment
trust cases suggests judicial recourse to analogous situations. Where a rail-
road, different parts of which are covered by different mortgages, goes into
ment to use 138 out of 194 cars leased. The owners replevied the remaining 56 from the
C. & N. W. Ry. and turned them over to the receiver, who retained but did not use
them. He was held liable for all the cars.
26. Frank v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 23 Fed. 123 (C. C. Colo. 1MR5).
27. Answer of Receivers p. 5.
28. "Stand by" service means that the equipment is ready for use if required. Such
equipment is valuable since the demand for a railroad's services fluctuates; yet it must,
as a common carrier, stand ready to carry all who ask. Such a reserve is particularly
necessary to a line with intensely seasonal business like the Florida East Coast.
29. See Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313 (1892). But see Myer v. Car
Co., 102 U. S. 1 (1880).
30. On the other hand it is argued that since there is a considerable initial payment,
a stipulated rental amortizing the rest of the purchase price may not exceed reasonable
compensation for user.
31. All the cases cited supra note 19, except the Sunflowaer Oil case, awarded com-
pensation on a reasonable rental basis. Oscar Heineman Corp. v. Nat Levy & Co., 6 F.
(2d) 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), is an example of the use of the stipulated rent as prima
fade reasonable.
32. Included within "maintenance" are not only repairs, but also depredation, taxes,
insurance and any other proper charges.
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receivership, a frequently used method to allocate earnings and principal
between different mortgagees is the determination, during a specified test
period, of the portion of net income attributable to different mortgage divi-
sions. This is known as a "segregation formula." 3 Since it requires the
allocation of expenses as well as earnings, some procedure for crediting and
charging divisions with the use of equipment covered by one mortgage and
used upon another division must be adopted . 4 In a recent case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals specifically rejected a calculation of value to the
user upon the basis of earnings in favor of the investment plus maintenance
formula. 35 The court found that the former computation did not reflect the
value of the equipment to the owner, that, indeed, it did not accurately reflect
value to the user unless all earnings were deemed attributable to the particu-
lar equipment, and that it violated the policy of the ICC in favor of a uniform
equipment charge. The court relied as analogy on the custom of independent
railroads in using an equipment rental charge based on the investment plus
maintenance factors.
Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,3 6 formulas for allocating income
between different claimants in railroad reorganizations may be referred to
the ICC for opinion as to their fairness. In a number of cases involving com-
pensation for the use of equipment, the Commission has taken a position simi-
lar to that of the court in the case referred to above.37 It has suggested an
investment plus maintenance formula, and in one case raised the percentage
return from 2%, which was the return the railroad was actually earning on
its property, to 4%, which it considered a fair average on equipment invest-
ments in the market.38 Reliance was placed upon market rates and the prac-
tice of independent railroads.
Despite the possible objection that it does not adequately reflect value to
the user-an objection which loses validity since retention of the equipment
is at the instance of the user and not of the owner - the suggested invest-
ment plus maintenance formula seems practical. A formula based on earn-
ings must be purely arbitrary in the absence of any method of allocating sys-
tem earnings to particular equipment. Moreover, both the mileage and
earnings tests have been implicitly and sometimes expressly rejected in rail-
road equipment cases holding that a receiver must compensate for retention
of equipment without reference to use or benefit.3 9 Further support for the
formula is found in action taken by the independent railroads: in arranging
for car hire rates, where value to the user as well as to the owner is pre-
33. For a thorough discussion of this and other formulas see Meck and Masten,
Railroad Leases and Reorganization: 1 (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 626, 640 c seq.
34. See Meck and Masten, supra note 33, at 643.
35. In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 108 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
36. BANxRUPTcy AcT §77(c)(10), 11 U. S. C. §205(c)(10) (Supp. 1938).
37. New York, S. & W. R. R. Reorg., 236 I. C. C. 425 (1939); Denver & R. G.
W. R. R. Reorg., 233 I. C. C. 515 (1939) ; Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. Reorg., 228 I. C. C.
209 (1938); New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., 224 I. C. C. 723 (1938). The last
case involved equipment of the lessee used on a line covered by a disaffirmed lease. The
allocation problem-and the basic purpose-is the same as in the mortgage division cases.
38. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Reorg., 233 1. C. C. 515 (1939).
39. See note 25 supra.
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sumably considered, they abandoned the mileage basis in favor of an invet-
ment plus maintenance formula, with the approval of the ICC.40
In applying this formula the percentage rates will probably be governed
by market rates of return on similar investments during the period in ques-
tion, while maintenance charges may be ascertained from conservative railroad
practice. The justification for such charges is the equitable duty of the court
to return the equipment in as good condition as when the receivership began,
or to make payments which will equalize its depreciation. The receivers witl,
of course, be credited with expenditures actually made by them for main-
tenance and repair during their tenure,41 and will not be obligated to make
good deficiencies in maintenance accruing before their appointment.42-
The final problem is the relative priority of the equipment owner's claim.
Where the receivership is at the instance of bondholders, and where the equip-
ment is actually used, payment for its use is held to be an "operating ex-
pense" and a debt of the receivership. 43 The owner is therefore entitled to
priority over bondholders' claims with respect not un,y to income but gen-
erally to the corpus as well.44 Since the bondholders moved the c-,,urt to take
possession of the equipment and to use it to keep the road in operation and
to preserve its property and franchises, their implied consent to this priority
is assumed.45 While necessity to the road is a basis of this rationale, the
court does not generally inquire into the extent to which the equipment was
actually necessary, this being regarded as peculiarly within the province of
the receivers. 46 During the period, however, when receivership is at the in-
stance of other creditors, it has been held that the equipment owner is en-
40. Rules for Car Hire Settlement, 160 I. C. C. 369 (1930). The change occurred in
1902.
41. In the Florida East Coast case the receivers presumably paid taes and insurance,
as well as $30,000 for repairs during the five year period. They claim this was enough.
Answer of Receivers, p. 6. Petitioner asserts that it was inadequate.
42. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1S93).
43. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Co., 117 U. S. 434 (1886); Platt v. Phila-
delphia & R. H. R., 84 Fed. 535 (C. C. A. 3d, 1898) ; Frank v. Denver & R. G. Ry., 23
Fed. 123 (C. C. Colo. 1885); Turner v. Indianapolis, B. & W. Ry., 24 Fed. Cas. 372,
No. 14,260 (C. C. Ind. 1879).
44. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893); Kneeland v. American Loan
Co., 136 U. S. 89 (1890); Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Co., 117 U. S. 434
(1885); 2%fyer v. Car Co., 102 U. S. 1 (1880); Hubbell v. Te.as So. Ry., 59 Tex. Civ.
App. 157 (1910), writ of error refztsed, 104 Tex. 712 (1911) (priority over both hanl-
holders and receivers' certificates). The rule applied in the disaffirmance of leased lines-
that they are operated for the account of the lessor, and the lessee cannot be charged
with resulting deficits [Meck and Masten, supra note 33, at 6591-is not applicable to
leased equipment. The leased line is also a common carrier and must be operated unless
permission to abandon is obtained. If deficits accrue, the lessor would have to pay them
if the lessee's receiver returned the line, and therefore the receiver should not Le charged
for them if he retains it. These reasons do not apply to equipment, terminals, bridges,
etc., and hence the cases draw a distinction. See North Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Lenecs,
82 F. (2d) 9, 14 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Pennsvlvania Steel Co. v. New York City Rys.,
198 Fed. 721, 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
45. Kneeland v. American Loan Co., 136 U. S. 89 (1890).
46. Frank v. Denver & R. G. W. Ry., 23 Fed. 123 (C. C. Colo. 1835).
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titled to priorities only from the income, since neither bondholders nor equip-
ment owners have moved the court to take possession of the other's prop-
erty.47
Well established law, therefore, seems to give the district court an adequate
background, despite the scarcity of equipment trust disaffirmances,48 against
which to work out the practical application of the remedy sought. Mean-
while, its decision accepting the remedy in principle appears not only to accord
with sound equitable doctrines, but also to implement the understanding of
equipment trust investors, who rely on their title as assurance that, whatever
happens, the railroad will not be able to retain and use their equipment with-
out rendering compensation.
THE MARITIME LIEN AND DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE OF FISHERMEN*
ALTHOUGH stipulated wages are today the usual form of compensation
for mariners' services, seamen are occasionally rewarded by a share in the
profits of an adventure. Used largely in fishing voyages, this share, or
"fishing lay,"' is considered by the courts to be substantially the same as
wages. Therefore, on the analogy of the wage lien of merchant seamen,
2
fishermen commonly have a lien for their shares in the voyage.8 The lien
47. Kneeland v. American Loan Co., 136 U. S. 89 (1890).
48. Up to 1924, Duncan reports only two instances of disaffirmance of a standard
equipment trust lease where certificates were in the hands of the public. DUNCAN, op.
cit. supra note 1, 22. Some of the additional cases cited in this Note are instances where
the trust obligations were in the hands of vendors, not the public.
*Old Point Fish Co. v. Haywood, 109 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
1. For a common type of sharing agreement, the "quarter lay," see The Georglana,
245 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917). Only expenses clearly agreed upon may be deducted
from the catch. Goodrich v. The Domingo, 10 *Fed. Cas. 605, No. 5,543 (D. Cal. 1870).
The seamen have no property in the catch itself, but only in the proceeds from its sale.
Lewis v. Chadbourne, 54 Me. 484 (1865) (mackerel) ; Jay v. Almy, 13 Fed. Cas. 387,
No. 7,236 (C. C. D. Mass. 1846) (whaling). The sharesmen are not considered partners,
nor are they part owners of the fish caught. The Mettacomet, 230 Fed. 308 (D. Mass.
1915) ; Crowell v. Knight, 6 Fed. Cas. 910, No. 3,445 (D. Mass. 1874). For a general
discussion, see The Elk, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 714 (D. Mass. 1938) ; The Carrier Dove,
93 Fed. 978 (D. Mass. 1899) ; RoBINsoN, ADmiRALTY (1939) 2$1; 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY
(5th ed. 1925) 129.
2. For a history of the maritime lien, see The Young Mechanic, 30 Fed. Cas. 873,
No. 18,180 (C. C. D. Me. 1855); The Nestor, 18 Fed. Cas. 9, No. 10,126 (C. C. D, Me.
1831) ; Beach, Relative Priority of Maritime Liens (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 841; Comment
(1915) 15 COL. L. REv. 343. Seamen have from early days had a lien on the vessel for
their wages. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 369; 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925)
128. And fishermen hired for stipulated wages have a lien. The Virginia Belle, 204 Fed.
692 (E. D. Va. 1913); The Minna, 11 Fed. 759 (E. D. Mich. 1882).
3. For the purpose of recovering their shares, fishermen are generally considered
to be hired seamen who are paid a contingent wage. Thus the share, like seamen's wages,
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for wages, which is the first to be satisfied from the proceeds of judicial
sale,4 is extended to compensation for wrongful discharge, the damages being
fixed by statute in certain cases 5 at one month's wages. Sharing agreements,
however, with the exception of certain tpes of written contracts, are governed
only by general maritime law;G no statute binds the courts in awarding
damages for discharge. Hence where a fisherman, sailing on shares, is
wrongfully discharged before the completion of his voyage, he is generally
granted a lien for his full share in the total catch,7 rather than merely for
such fraction of his share as accumulated while he was actually on board.
The "unearned" part of his share is compensation for the wrong done him.8
An unusual case of wrongful discharge of share lien fishermen was recently
presented to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.0 Seven fishermen, including
the master, had set out from Hampton, Virginia, under an oral agreement
to work a trawler on a lay. After several days, during which some ,-00
worth of fish were caught,10 the vessel developed engine trouble and was
towed into port for repairs. Shortly thereafter, while still at the dock, the
is protected by a maritime lien, and may be recovered by the usual in rem proceeding
against the vessel. The Georgiana, 245 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917) ; Welch v. Fallen,
181 Fed. 875 (D. Mass. 1909); The Carrier Dove, 93 Fed. 978 (D. Mass. 1899).
4. Clifford v. Merritt-Chapman and Scott Corp., 57 F. (2d) 1021 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932); Butler v. Ellis, 45 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); The William Leishear,
21 F. (2d) 862 (D. Md. 1927); RoBiNso., AD rMLLTY (1939) 422.
5. REv. STAT. § 4527 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 594 (1934). This statute only applies
if the discharge occurs before commencement of the voyage, or before one month's wages
have been earned. Not a punishment for the master, but a well-defined rule of damages,
the statute was intended to afford seamen "a simple, summary method of establishing
and enforcing damages." The Steel Trader, 275 U. S. 388, 390 (1923). For similar
provisions compensating the seaman for delay in the payment of his wages, see Rwv. ST,%T.
§4529 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 596 (1934).
6. By 18 STAT. 64 (1874), 46 U. S. C. §544 (1934), the statute cited steta note 5
is made inapplicable to "any case where the seamen are by custom or agreement entitled
to participate in the profits or result of a cruise, or voyage." Certain types of cod and
mackerel voyages are, however, governed by statute. In each case the agreement between
master and crew must be written and signed. REv. STAT. § 4391 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 531
(1934). Fishermen sailing under such agreements have a lien against the vessel for their
shares. REv. STAT. § 4393 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 533 (1934). But these fishery statutes,
like the statutes regulating merchant seamen, are strictly construed. The ZR-3, 18 F. (2d)
122 (fV. D. Wash. 1927) (no application where wvages instead of shares). Shipping on
a lay, on an oral agreement, and on terms different from those set out in R-. ST T.
§§ 4391-3, leaves to the fishermen the rights ordinarily accorded by law. The American
Beauty, 295 Fed. 513 (IV. D. Wash. 1924); The Cornelia M. Kingsland, 25 Fed. 85
(S. D. N. Y. 1885).
7. See Note 24, infra.
8. The American Beauty, 295 Fed. 513, 516 (V. D. Wash. 1924).
9. Old Point Fish Co. v. Haywood, 109 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) (Judge
Parker dissenting).
10. The arrangement in substance provided that the crew would furnish fuel, ice
and food, and receive 60% of the gross proceeds of the catch. The remaining 40%o were
to go to the ship owner, who furnished the boat and tackle. The fish actually caught
were of so little value as to fall below the cost of the oil and food provided by the crew.
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trawler was libeled for an old repair bill; whereupon numerous other creditors
intervened to enforce similar claims, the total indebtedness amounting to
more than $16,000. Five of the crew, discharged by this arrest without their
consent, filed intervening libels, claiming roughly $1000 each - their estimated
shares from a completed voyage - as damages for breach of contract of
employment. The vessel was sold for less than $6000. The fish actually
caught constituted so minute a fraction of the usual season's catch as to
afford the district court no direct basis for assessing the damages. Without
a full catch from which to compute full lays, the district court, by analogy to
the merchant seamen damage statute," awarded four of the men a lien for
$100 each, their average monthly earnings on similar voyages in the past. 12
The circuit court, pointing out that the statute does not apply to agree-
ments providing for a share in the profits of a voyage, disallowed the award
on appeal. The decision of the court was based on two grounds: first, that
liens do not exist for damages consequential upon arrest of the vessel; second,
that the maritime lien, being secret and acting to the prejudice of general
creditors and purchasers without notice, is stricti juris" and would not be
extended by analogy or inference. In commenting on the actual award of
one month's "wages," the court noted that, while stipulated wages form a
calculable basis for damages, the amount in this case was "too speculative"
to be estimated.
One basis for the court's opinion - that the admiralty law does not allow
a prior lien for damages consequential upon a legal arrest of a vessel - is
open to varied interpretations. The court seemingly employed the doctrine
as a general statement of the rule that no lien attaches for services rendered
to a vessel in custodia legis.14 But this rule seems inapplicable to the instant
11. Rv. STAT. § 4527 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 594 (1934). Since the discharge occurred
within one month of the start of the voyage, the situation in the instant case is analogous
in this respect to those covered by the statute.
12. The district court found that, without their fault, and as a result of the owner's
indebtedness, the fishermen would probably be unable to obtain similar employment at this
advanced date in the season, and that the statute furnished a fair standard by which to
adjudge their claims. Brief for Appellants, p. 4 .
13. See Piedmont and Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U. S. 1,
.12 (1920); Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How. 82, 89 (U. S. 1857). The stricli juris rule
is a convenient instrument by which the courts can refuse to recognize the existence of a
lien. A court that applies the rule will in the same opinion point out that a lien will be
found, by analogy, where "changing conditions of human activity" require it. The
Neptune, 277 Fed. 230, 231 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921). Whether or not to recognize a new
lien seems, therefore, to depend for its answer upon the equities of the case. See also
1 BEN DiCT, ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) 19, 95.
14. It has ordinarily been held that events subsequent to the legal seizure of a vessel
do not give rise to liens against her while she remains in custodia legis. See Collie v.
Fergusson, 281 U. S. 52, 55 (1930). Thus no lien attaches for wages due for services
rendered to the vessel after her seizure. The Bethlehem, 286 Fed. 400 (E. D. Pa. 1923) ;
The Nisseqogue, 280 Fed. 174 (E. D. N. C. 1922). But the crew obtain their compensa-
tion for wrongful discharge, under REV. STAT. § 4527 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 594 (1934).
The Astoria, 281 Fed. 618 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). See Roauwsog, ADMIRALTY (1939) 366.
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case.15 Damages for wrongful discharge are never granted for services after
discharge, as such services are never in fact rendered. A lien does exist,
however, not for services, but as compensation for the loss occasioned by
the wrongful act of the owner, which in this case consisted in permitting
the legal arrest to end the voyage. If, on the other hand, the court means
that the libeling of a vessel, with consequent termination of the voyage, is
not considered the legal equivalent of a wrongful discharge, it would seem
to be in error.' 6 Discharge of a seaman in consequence of the judicial sale
of a vessel is regarded as the act of the owner, leaving the vessel liable to
the seaman to the same extent the owner would be.17 Where the damage
statute does not govern, it has been held that the owner, in permitting the
vessel to be sold for his debt, violates his contract with the seamen,'5 and that
it is the owner's duty to give a bond and continue the voyage.10 Moreover,
where the statute does govern, legal arrest of the vessel generally breah-s up
the voyage and gives the usual statutory lien for damages.1-3
In opposing extension of the maritime lien into new fields, the court in
this case was following orthodox admiralty doctrine.2 1 Statutes creating such
liens are strictly construed,2 2 and courts will rarely recognize the existence
15. The fact that libelants sought as damages the earnings which would have accrued
after seizure of the vessel by the marshal may have obscured the true nature of the action
in the instant case. The court's confusion seems to have arisen out of the similarity
between the methods employed in calculating the award for wrongful discharge and that
for services rendered to a vessel in custodia legis. In both situations the basis for calcula-
tion lies in the period subsequent to legal arrest. Due to this confusion, perhaps, the
court refused to grant a lien; a lien is granted for damages for discharge, but not for
services to an arrested vessel.
16. Seizure of the vessel by the marshal puts an end to the voyage, entitling seamen
to damages for wrongful discharge under REv. STAT. §452n (1875), 46 U. S. C. §594
(1934). The Great Canton, 299 Fed. 953 (E. D. N. Y. 1924); The Astoria, 281 Fed. 613
(C. C. A. 5th, 1922). Subsequent intervention by the seamen does not constitute a vaiver
of their right to damages for such discharge, since their act in libeling the vessel is
merely an election to treat their engagement as put to an end by the owner's abandonment
of the vessel. The Charles L. Baylis, 25 Fed. 862 (S. D. N. Y. 1S85) ; see The Nisseqlogue,
280 Fed. 174, 184 (E. D. N. C. 1922); The Esteban de Antunano, 31 Fed. 920, 925
(C. C. E. D. La. 1887).
17. The Hudson, 12 Fed. Cas. 805, 806, No. 6,831 (S. D. N. Y. 1846). Although the
discharge was there effected by a third party, the seizure of the vessel has itself been
held to operate as a wrongful discharge of the crew. The Esteban de Antunano, 31 Fed.
920, 925 (C. C. E. D. La. 1887); Woolf v. The Oder, 30 Fed. Cas. 600, No. 18,027
(D. Pa. 1802) ; see Wells v. Osmond, 6 Mod. 238, 87 E. R. 987 (K. B. 1705).
18. "The voyage has been broken up by the fault of the owner, as he permitted the
vessel to be sold for his debt. This was a violation of his contract with the libellants,
for which they have a right to recover a full indemnity." The Gazelle, 10 Fed. Cas. 127,
128, No. 5,289 (D. Mass. 1858). Contra: The Frank and Willie, 45 Fed. 483 (S. D.
N. Y. 1891).
19. Van Beuren v. Wilson, 9 Cow. 158 (N. Y. 18).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. See note 13 supra.
22. See note 6 supra. An interesting example of strict construction is afforded by
decisions under the FEDERAL MAnAm-r LYEN AcT oF 1910, 36 STAT. 604 (1910), now
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of new liens by analogy. This restrictive treatment has, however, largely
developed in cases involving the rights of materialmen or repairmen.2 3 Seamen
have always been in a privileged position under the general maritime law,
and, prior to the enactment of the statutes governing wrongful discharge,
courts granted liens for damages covering such discharge2 4 and exercised
broad discretion in assessing the compensation to be awarded.2 , When statutes
fixing a definite compensation were enacted, judicial freedom was restricted
in situations where they applied.2 6 Where they did not apply directly -and
statutes relating to seamen and fishermen are strictly construed in their direct
application,2 7 - the courts retained possession of the discretionary powers
which they had previously exercised.2 8 There is, therefore, no attempt to
extend the maritime lien in this case. Where no statute governs, it is difficult
to understand why the courts may not continue to grant damage liens in the
familiar manner, and in the exercise of discretion utilize the statutes as a
guide or standard. The rule of strict construction would not be contravened
so long as the statute were not held to apply directly; yet the customary
policy of leniency toward seamen 29 would thereby be satisfactorily observed.
merged in 41 STAT. 1005 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 971 et seq. (1934). The J. Doherty, 207
Fed. 997 (S. D. N. Y. 1913); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1st ed. 1939) 373.
23. Piedmont and Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U. S. 1
(1920); The Suelco, 286 Fed. 286 (D. N. Y. 1923); The Muskegon, 275 Fed, 348
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921). But cf. The Artemis, 53 F. (2d) 672 (S. D. N. Y. 1931). Yet in
the case of seamen a maritime lien for personal injuries arising from unseaworthiness,
etc., has not been extended despite the convenient analogy afforded by the Jones Act.
Plamals v. Pinar del Rio, 277 U. S. 151 (1928). But see The State of Maryland, 85 F.
(Zd) 944 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; Note (1937) 37 CoL. L. REV. 480.
24. Where fishermen sailing on shares are wrongfully discharged before the voyage
would normally have ended, they have a lien on the vessel for their full share, including
that part which accrued, or would have accrued, after such discharge. The American
Beauty, 295 Fed. 513 (W. D. Wash. 1924) (voyage continued after discharge); The
Page, 18 Fed. Cas. 977, No. 10,660 (D. Cal. 1878) (voyage abandoned) ; The Hibernia,
12 Fed. Cas. 112, No. 6,455 (D. Mass. 1844) (voyage continued).
25. Courts have generally stated that they are free to award damages for wrongful
discharge in accordance with the equities of the case. McKenzie v. The Oglethorpe, 16
Fed. Cas. 204, 206, No. 8,857 (S. D. N. Y. 1841) ; Hindman v. Shaw, 12 Fed. Cas. 200,
No. 6,514 (D. Pa. 1806) ; Woolf v. The Oder, 30 Fed. Cas. 600, No. 18,027 '(D. Pa.
1802) ; Thompson v. The Oakland, 23 Fed. Cas. 1064, 1065, No. 13,971 (D. Mass. 1841).
26. Where the statute applies, no more than one month's wages may be awarded as
damages, for it prescribes an exclusive remedy. The Steel Trader, 275 U. S. 388 (1928),
23 ILL L. REv. 292. The statute is, however, strictly construed in its direct application.
The Golden Kauri, 28 F. Supp. 288 (E. D. La. 1939) (seaman discharged after one
month). See notes 6, 22 supra.
27. See notes 6, 22 supra.
28. See The American Beauty, 295 Fed. 513, 516 (W. D. Wash. 1924).
29. "Sailors are indulged in courts of admiralty." Clifford v. Merritt-Chapman and
Scott Corp., 57 F. (2d) 1021, 1024 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932). There are innumerable examples
of this leniency to seamen. Goodrich v. The Domingo, 10 Fed. Cas. 605, No. 5,543 (D.
Cal. 1870) ; Hussey v. Fields, 12 Fed. Cas. 1061, No. 6,947 (D. Mass. 1858) ; The M. M.
Morrill, 78 Fed. 509 (D. Wash. 1897); Dexter v. Munroe, 7 Fed. Cas. 616, No. 3,863
(D. Mass. 1861). This leniency and justice extends to awards of damages for wrongful
In view of the equitable approach often used by courts of admiralty,20 the
use of the statute as a "fair standard" would appear proper under the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
If a lien be granted, difficulties arise in computing the amount thereof. By
accepted damage standards, the wrongful discharge award is considered com-
pensation for loss of earning power.31 Before the statutes prescribed such
damages, courts ordinarily granted wages for the time reasonably consumed
by a return voyage to the original port of shipment, deducting from this
amount whatever the seamen actually earned from other employment during
that period.32 The presumption was that he could easily obtain new employ-
ment in his home port.33 Since, on the other hand, fishermen could find
employment only at certain times of the year, their loss of earning power
was greater. Courts, therefore, customarily awarded them a full lay, regard-
less of the length of time a return voyage might require.34
One important factor, however, distinguished this case from the usual
situation- no full catch existed from which the damages could be estimated,
making any amount awarded purely speculative. But this difficulty seems
to be of a purely mechanical nature. When hypothetical full catches have
previously been calculated from actual catches, there has never been so brief
a period from which to reckon.-- Furthermore, although it is possible to
discharge. Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, No. 4,441 (C. C. D. Mass. 1316). And
to awards for wages. The James H. Shrigley, 50 Fed. 287 (N. D. N. Y. 1S92).
30. Courts of admiralty apply equitable principles to the distribution of funds in their
possession. United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U. S. 184, 194 (1905). See
O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287, 297 (1397) ; August Honerkamp Lumber Co. v. Steves
Lumber and Building Co., 95 F. (2d) 593, 596 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
31. For a good discussion of the nature of damages for wrongful discharge, see the
opinion of Judge Story in Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, No. 4441 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1816).
32. For examples of the various awards in wrongful discharge situations, see The
Artisan, 2 Fed. Cas. 3, No. 563 (E. D. N. Y. 1877) (discharge before voyage; voyage
abandoned); The Acorn, 32 Fed. 638 (W. D. Pa. 1837) (discharge before vo:.-age;
voyage prosecuted) ; Baton Rouge and B. S. Packet Co. v. George, 128 Fed. 914 (C. C. A.
5th, 1904) (discharge during voyage; voyage abandoned); The Gazelle, 10 Fed. Cas.
127, No. 5,289 (D. Mass. 1853) (voyage ended by legal arrest); The Maria, 16 Fed.
Cas. 725, No. 9,074 (S. D. N. Y. 1832) (discharge during voyage; voyage continues).
Where the seamen were paid in shares rather than wages: The Page, 18 Fed. Cas. 977,
No. 10,660 (D. Cal. 1878) (hypothetical full share); Mahoon v. The Glocester, 16 Fed.
Cas. 499, No. 8,970 (Admiralty Court, Pa. 1780) (full share); The American Beauty,
295 Fed. 513 (W. D. Wash. 1924) (full share, less earnings from other employment); see
The Paul L., 4 F. Supp. 537 (WV. D. Wash. 1933).
33. Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, 637 (C. C. D. Mlass. 1S16).
34. See note 32 supra.
35. The only case in point seems to be The Page, 18 Fed. Cas. 977, No. 10,6f')
(D. Cal. 1878), where the voyage was wrongfully abandoned when half over. The court
calculated a hypothetical full catch by doubling what each man had caught. For somewhat
similar "speculation,' see The Paul L., 4 F. Supp. 537 (W. D. WVash. 1933). The contrary
result is reached by a variety of paths. The Mettacomet, 230 Fed. 303 (D. Mass. 1915)
(no express agreement covering failure to catch enough fish) ; The General McPherson,
100 Fed. 860 (D. Wash. 1900) (nothing liquidated due); The Fair Play, 8 Fed. Cas.
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multiply the fish caught by a time-factor, in the instant case the time spent
on the water was so short as to raise doubts with regard to its value as a
typical period. The actual daily catch in all probability deviated considerably
from the average for a completed trip. Data as to former voyages may,
however, be used in calculating damages, where other evidence is insuffi-
cient.3 6 Under the circumstances, the district court chose to find in the
evidence of past earnings a basis for computing a fair monthly wage, and
granted a lien for that sum on the analogy of the statute granting merchant
seamen wrongful discharge damages of one month's wages.
In view of the almost identical nature of wages and shares and the im-
practicability of using the actual catch as a basis for estimating a hypothetical
full one, the district court's use of the statute as a fair standard for assessing
damages seems a proper and equitable course. The decision of the circuit
court, in contrast, not only disregards settled maritime law by refusing a
lien, but also indicates a disposition to restrict the flexible determination of
damages in a sphere where judicial discretion has hitherto been unhampered.3 7
THE POWER TO INVADE CORPUS IN FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF TRUSTS*
IN providing for federal taxation of trust income Congress clearly intended
that, although non-exempt income should be taxed but once, no income should
escape taxation unless definitely exempt.' Section 162(b) allows a trustee
to deduct from net income "the amount of the income of the estate or trust
for its taxable year which is to be distributed currently by the fiduciary to
the beneficiaries," but provides that "the amount so allowed as a deduction
shall be included in computing the net income of the beneficiaries."' 2 In view
957, No. 4,615 (S. D. N. Y. 1830) (admiralty cannot grant accounting); Williams
v. The Sylph, 29 Fed. Cas. 1407, No. 17,740 (S. D. N. Y. 1841). Some of these argu-
ments seem to revert to the limited jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty. Simple
accountings have been granted in admiralty. The I. S. E. 2, 15 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A.
9th, 1926) ; The Carrier Dove, 93 Fed. 978 (D. Mass. 1899).
36. The Paul L., 4 F. Supp. 537, 540 (W. D. Wash. 1933) (alternative holding).
37. Although the libelants in the instant case would have had an action in personam
against the shipowner for breach of contract, his insolvency rendered such remedy useless.
See Baton Rouge and B. S. Packet Co. v. George, 128 Fed. 914 (C. C. A. 5th, 1904) ;
Nevitt v. Clarke, 18 Fed. Cas. 29, No. 10,138 (S. D. N. Y. 1846) ; Jay v. Almy, 13 Fed.
Cas. 387, No. 7,236 (C. C. D. Mass. 1846).
*Estate of. Edward T. Bedford, 39 B. T. A. 1039 (1939), appeal dislsi'd, 4 Prentice-
Hall 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. 61,024 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
1. Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. SY 365 (1933) ; Estate of Edward T. Bedford,
39 B.T.A. 1039 (1939) ; 61 CONG. REc. 7112 (1921).
2. INT. REv. CODE §162(b) (1939). During estate administration, and where in
the fiduciary's discretion income is distributed or accumulated, § 162(c) allows him deduc-
tion for income which is properly paid or credited. For similar provisions see N. Y. TAX
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of the wording of the statute, the Supreme Court's holding in Irwin v. Gavil
that a bequest of trust income only is annually taxable to the beneficiary as
income from a bequest, rather than entirely exempt from income tax as a
bequest,3 accords with the Congressional purpose of taxing the recipient and
granting the trustee a deduction. At the same time, it represents a definite
encroachment upon the exemption usually accorded bequests. In Burnet T,.
Whitehouse, involving a bequest of fixed annual sums to be paid from income
if sufficient but from corpus if necessary, the Court refused to follow the
lead of the Irwin case. It held, rather, that the threat of corpus invasion
rendered the entire payment exempt as a bequest, even though in fact the
entire payment was made from income.4
This decision immediately raised the issue of taxability of the trustee: to
permit the trustee a deduction for income distributed would leave the income
entirely untaxed. Helvering v. Pardce denied the deduction, holding that
the "payments . . . were not distribution of income; but in discharge of
a gift or legacy. The principle applied in Burnet v. TFhilelhouse . . . is
not applicable." 5 The trustee's deduction under Section 162(b) of payments
of trust income was thus apparently conditioned upon the taxability of the
income to the beneficiary.0
LAw §365; Ky. STAT. Axx. (Carroll, 1936) §428Ib-29; N. M. STAT. Am.. (Court-
right, Supp. 1938) § 141-1527. See generally Rosenbloom, Federal Income Tax on
Decedents Estates During Period of Administration (1938) 12 TEM.P. L Q. 149.
3. 268 U. S. 161 (1925). IxT. REV. CODE § 22(b) (3) (1939) excludes from gross
income gifts and bequests but not the income therefrom. "The language quoted leaves
no doubt in our minds that if a fund were given to trustees for A for life With remainder
over, the income received by the trustees and paid over to A would be income of A
under the statute. It seems to us hardly less clear that even if there were a specific
provision that A should have no interest in the corpus, the payments would be income
none the less . . ." Id. at 167. See MAGILL, TAXAB E INco.m (1936) 381. The argument
of the dissent that the money here sought to be taxed was not the fruits of a legacy,
but was the legacy itself, is at least as convincing.
4. 283 U. S. 148 (1931). The threat of corpus invasion is determinative although
provision has been made for replenishment of corpus from subsequent income [James
R. Duncan, 34 B.T.A. 999 (1936), aff'd. 91 F. (2d) 1012 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937)], or by
remaindermen [Bay Trust Co., Trustee, 34 B. T. A. 233 (1936)].
5. 290 U. S. 365, 370 (1933).
6. The decision obviated contemplated amendments to § 162(b) and (c) providing
deduction only if taxed to the beneficiary. H. R. REP., Ways and 'Means Subcommittee,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 4, 1933-seven days prior to Helering t. Pardee); Scio.A:-'s
LEGISLATIvE HisToRY oF FEDERAL INconE TAx LAws (1938) 38.
These cases have sometimes loosely been cited as holding that to permit a deduction,
income must be distributed as such, and not as a fixed annuity. E.g., Marie Minor
Sanborn, 33 B.T.A. 1120, 1124 (1936), aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 134 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937). If
this, rather than taxability to the recipient, were the test, where a settlor of a charitable
inter vivos trust reserves to himself fixed annual payments the trustee would be denied
deduction. But since the gift and bequest exemptions do not apply here to the fixed
payments, the settlor, too, is taxed on their receipt, generally under § 22(b) (2) as an
annuity, Anna L. Raymond, 40 B. T. A. No. 45, July 20, 1939. The tax to the settlor
would properly be based on the full payment since the return of capital of a commercial
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The principles established in these cases have not been carried over intact
to the closely related Section 162 (a) which allows a deduction to the trustee
of "any part of the gross income,7 without limitation, which pursuant to
the terms of the will or deed creating the trust, is during the year paid or
permanently set aside" for charitable purposes. In a recent case the testator
provided for the maintenance of certain public gardens, the trust corpus to
be invaded if net income proved insufficient.8 Reasoning that these payments
were annuities and therefore tax-free bequests under Buru ct v. Whitehouse,
the Commissioner relied on the Pardee case to deny the trustee deductions
for the amounts paid out of income, although he conceded their charitable
natuie. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, supported the trustee and held
that deductions under Section 162(a) were granted pursuant to an exemption
fostering charitable donations; unlike those in Section 162(b) and despite
cases such as Helvering v. Pardee arising thereunder, they did not depend
upon taxability to the recipient.
To be compared with the Board's disregard of the power to invade corpus
as a factor in this type of charitable case is the attitude taken in other types
of cases under Section 162(a). Where the testator establishes a trust for a
charitable institution but directs that fixed annuities be paid to certain in-
dividuals out of trust income, or corpus if necessary, the issue arises whether
surplus income or capital gains0 are deductible by the trustee as "permanently
set aside" to the charitable remainderman, although subject to possible re-
covery if future income proves inadequate.10 A few opinions have adopted
the uncompromising view of the Whitehouse case that the mere threat of
annuity is not here contemplated. Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 660; Note (1939)
34 ILL. L. REV. 348. The resultant double taxation would be contrary to the purpose of
§ 162. See § 3801(b) (4) reference to "correlative" inclusion or deduction under § 162(b)
and (c).
7. Since 1937 the Treasury has directed treatment "as shares of beneficiaries
[deducted from net income under § 162(b)], amounts of charitable contributions . . .
paid or permanently set aside as provided in Section 162(a)." Charles F. Grey, 41
B. T. A. No. 37, Jan. 31, 1940, held this resulted in partial denial of the deduction, which
should be made directly from gross income.
8. Estate of Edward T. Bedford, 39 B. T. A. 1039 (1939), appeal disn'd, 4 Prentice-
Hall 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. 61,024 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
9. In Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 8 F. Supp. 218 (D. C. Conn. 1934) the
wife had the income for life with power to invade the corpus for her comfortable
support" of an individual [Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A.
because, being charged on corpus, it was paid from corpus, leaving the full income "set
aside" for charity. The rationale seems questionable. Cf. F. G. Bonfils Trust, 40 B. T. A.
No. 167, Dec. 8, 1939.
10. The issue is presented in a variety of forms: (1) provision for the "comfortable
support" of an individual [Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A.
2d, 1929); Charles P. Moorman Home for Women v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 257
(W. D. Ky. 1930) (income accumulations only)]; (2) where the charity is rcsidual
remainderman after individual remaindermen receive fixed amounts [Gertrude Hemler
Tracy, 30 B.T. A. 1156 (1934)] or an undetermined amount [Charles W. Jaynes, 29
B. T. A. 259 (1933) ].
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invasion, however remote, precludes deduction. 1 But, drawing on parallel
cases arising under the estate tax,12 the courts have generally taken a more
realistic view. They have allowed the deduction where the expectancy of
an ample, continuing income dispels the threat of invasion, 13 and have denied
it where the margin is narrow and the prospects uncertain.14 Nevertheless,
had the trustees in these cases attempted to deduct under Section 162(b)
the fixed amounts paid to annuitants, the deductions would have been denied
under the Pardee case.
The curious contrast of denying the trustee a deduction for income paid
to annuitants because of the bare threat of corpus invasion, while granting
deduction for the remaining income set aside for charity because of the
remoteness of that threat, suggests reconsideration of the effect to be accorded
to the presence of a power to invade corpus. The rule of Burtn v. White-
house has frequently been criticized for adopting as the test of income "not
the common understanding of the term, nor even the actual source of the
payment, but rather the remotely possible source. '' i It may also be criticized
as a device for tax avoidance. The settlor, by inserting in the trust instrument
a power to invade corpus (even though the prospect of invasion is remote)
shifts the burden of taxation to a trustee; multiplication of trusts reduces
surtax rates. Consequently, attempts to justify the case in terms of the
settlor's intent are at once question-begging and unrealistic.' It is true, of
11. Charles P. Moorman Home for Women v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 257 (I. D.
Ky. 1930) ; see Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., Ex'r, 31 B.T.A. 19, 22 (1934), aff'd, 76 F.
(2d) 1010 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935).
12. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). The issue is whether
the power to invade corpus renders corpus gifts to charity too uncertain to be exempt.
With adequate income, said Mr. Justice Holmes, "there was no uncertainty appreciably
greater than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs.' Id. at 154. Humphrey
v. Millard, 79 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
13. Capital gains: Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A.
2d, 1929); Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 41 F. (2d) 69 (D. Conn. 1930); Helen
G. Bonfils, E='r, 40 B. T. A. No. 166, Dec. 8, 1939. Surplus income: Hartford Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., 20 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1325 (D. Conn.
1937).
But since litigation may be required to establish the sufficiency of the income, drafts-
men should carefully weigh the insertion of a power to invade corpus.
14. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933),
cert. denied, 290 U. S. 700 (1933) (surplus income) criticizes Hartford-Conn. Trust Co.
v. Eaton, 29 F. (2d) 840 (D. Conn. 1928) (holding that until the power to invade corpus
actually was exercised, capital gains were "set aside" to charity), af'd, 36 F. (2d) 710
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (but on ground threat was remote).
15. AAI.L, TAXABLE INCOiE (1936) 383. See also Comment (1935) 44 Y.un
L. J. 660; Notes (1931) 31 Cob. L. REv. 1053, (1934) 34 Cob L. RE . 183.
16. All the cases are justified and reconciled upon a presumed intent of the parties
as to the incidence of tax in Comment (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L REv. 747. But it seems
undesirable that tax law interpretation should be governed by taxpayer's whim, especially
when motivated by tax reduction. Compare Congdon v. Comm'r, 99 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938) wherein the court implied a power to invade corpus, thereby shifting the tax
to the trustee.
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course, that the Whitehouse rule has long enjoyed nearly universal recog-
nition by the courts ;17 nevertheless, it has sometimes been overlooked,18 has
hot always been endorsed by the Commissioner, 9 and occasionally has been
avoided in decisions. 20 In view of Congressional acquiescence, 2 1 however,
its reconsideration probably calls for legislative action.
Action upon reconsideration might take several forms. One possibility is
statutory reversal of Irvin v. Gavit to exempt the legatee from income taxa-
tion on bequests of income. Such legislation would dismiss the unwonted
emphasis placed by the Whitehouse rule upon the threat of corpus invasion,
and restore the bequest exemption to its full vigor.22 A more extreme alterna-
tive, suggested by the fact that the distinction in the Whitehouse case was
drawn to preserve the income tax exemption of gifts and bequests, is abolition
of this exemption.2 3 Short of such far-reaching action, however, payments
should be taxed according to their actual and not their possible source. They
should be taxed to the beneficiary 24 and deducted by the trustee to the extent
17. Accord: People ex rel. Duncan v. Graves, 257 App. Div. 552, 13 N. Y. Supp.
(2d) 608 (3d Dep't 1939), under New York law, supra note 2. See also U. S. Treas.
Reg. 103 § 19.22(a)-12 (annuities charged on land); Benfield v. United States, 27 F.
Supp. 56 (Ct. Cl. 1939) (a will compromise); Murray Brookman, 41 B. T. A. No. 82,
March 7, 1940 (an alimony trust) ; Paul, Five Years with Douglas v. Willeuts (1939)
53 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12, n. 31.
18. In Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., 20 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 1325 (D. Conn. 1937), litigating § 162(a), deduction taken by the trustee under
§ 162(b) for annuity payments was apparently overlooked. In J. Edward Johnston, 41
B. T. A. No. 81, March 6, 1940, the beneficiary reported such payments as income. See
Peoples Trust Co., Trustee, 10 B. T. A. 1385 (1928). Instructions with Form 1041 (1939)
fail to mention the distinction between annuities and gifts of income, but trust instruments
must be filed with the Treasury Department.
19. Bay Trust Co., Trustee, 34 B. T. A. 233 (1936). Advantage to the revenue
depends upon surtax rates of trustee and beneficiary. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE
L. 3. 660, 666 (fairer to ise beneficiary's rate).
. 20. John K. Howard, Trustee, 34 B. T. A. 57 (1936) directed the trustee to pay the
income to the wife and to invade corpus if necessary for her "reasonable needs."
Separating these duties, the Board saw "no reason to say that the further power of the
trustee serves to change or becloud the character of the distribution so as to attract the
doctrine of the Pardee case," and permitted deduction. Id. at 59.
21. INT. REv. CODE § 3801(b) (4) (1939) and U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.3801 (b)--
make special provision for mitigation of limitation where the Whitehouse distinction was
not observed. See Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 82o of the Revenue Act of 1938
(1939) 48 YALE L. J. 509, 719, 760, n. 157.
22. Had Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 (1925) exempted the income beneficiary, that
income might have gone tax-free for the Revenue Act of 1913 apparently did not there
tax the trustee. Brief of Respondent, id. at 165, citing Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings
Bank, 257 U. S. 602 (1922). This compelling reason for the decision is no longer present,
INT. REv. CODE § 162(b) (1939) ; cf. Helvering v. Pardee, 290 U. S. 365 (1933).
23. For comprehensive discussion, see SIMON s, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938)
125-147; PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2d Series, 1938) 311.
24. Where there are several annuitants and income is insufficient to provide for them,
problems of allocation arise. In the absence of specific directions in the instrument,
pro rata distribution offers the most equitable solution.
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that they comprise distributable income, and exempted to the extent that
they come from corpus.25 Because taxation of the beneficiary is thus limited
to income from the trust, this solution intrudes no more upon the exemption
of bequests than did Irwin v. Gavit. W',rhile it may be "an anomaly to tax
the recipients for one year and exempt them for another simply because the
executors paid the first from income received and the second out of corpus,"20
this treatment has been adopted in at least one state.27 The anomaly can
certainly be no greater than that fostered by Burnet v. WVhittIouse.
25. A present change in the rule, however, might defeat the intent of testators and
settlors who drew instruments with Burnet v. 1lzfltchouse in mind.
26. Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, 151 (1931).
27. See Staples v. Comm'r of Corporations and Taxation, 24 N.E. (2d) 641, 643
(Sup. J. Ct Mass. 1940).
